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Introduction 
 
The History of European Integration  Research Society  (HEIRS) was 
founded in the summer of 2004 by a group of young researchers at the 
Universities of Cambridge and Portsmouth. Scattered archival data, difficulties 
in retrieving information regarding  ongoing research and the loneliness  that is 
typical of doctoral research prompted them to create a network of historians and 
political scientists working on the genesis of the integration process.  
 
The foundation of HEIRS also followed from a widespread recognition of the 
need to go beyond the restricted boundaries of national history and from a lively 
debate over the extent to which the integration process requires brand new 
categories and must be based on multinational archival research as well as on the 
use various materials and languages. For this reason collaboration among 
researchers and institutes becomes even more crucial than in nation-based history. 
Only through the continuous exchange of information can the history of European 
integration achieve valuable results. When we speak of ‘exchange of information’, 
we refer not only to the  standard contacts among researchers regarding the 
progress of one’s own research, which usually takes place in the form of 
conferences and seminars, but also to more pragmatic information regarding 
archives and databases. Multinational archival research entails  proficiency in 
various languages and  practical knowledge of  different kinds of cataloguing 
systems, admission procedures and copying rules. In this case the tips of a friend 
regarding a particular archival fond or advice regarding what archivist to contact 
for a specific kind of research not only saves time, but prevents mistakes and 
waste of time. Through the creation of a mailing list and of a database with the 
name of young researchers and their research interests, HEIRS aims to correct this 
shortcoming and particularly to foster multinational archival research. 
 
Although it is based at the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at University of 
Cambridge, HEIRS aims to foster exchange among young researchers working on 
the history of European integration, and to enhance collaboration  between 
institutions and research centres, across Europe. The initiative has already proven 
extremely for the researchers involved and has received positive feedback from 
established academics and students alike.  
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The first initiative organised by the HEIRS founding committee was a 
postgraduate conference designed to gather researchers together and to discuss the 
state of the field. The HEIRS Colloquium took place in Cambridge on the 6
th and 
7
th November 2004 at Wesley House. It gathered together forty young researchers 
in a creative and stimulating atmosphere.  
 
In view of the demand expressed by many researchers, we have decided to publish 
a selection of papers in the form of an online PDF booklet. This publication does 
not include all the papers presented at the Colloquium but only those whose 
authors decided to extend their paper. For this reasons, although e xtremely 
valuable,  the papers by  Giuliano Garavini,  Francois-Xavier  Laffeach and 
Emmanuelle Heriard Dubreuil have not been included. In other cases, because the 
authors have submitted their paper for publication in journals (Ludovica Marchi 
and Pyeongeok An), we have decided to publish only a short abstract of their 
work.  You can contact the authors through the email address you find at the 
bottom of their abstract. Finally, in two cases (Katja Seidel and Billy Davies), 
because they are still at the beginning of their research, we have decided to publish 
only a short paper with guidelines of future research.  
 
We would like to thank the Jean Monnet Centre  of Excellence at Cambridge 
University for their support and encouragement. We are also very grateful to Dr 
Julie Smith (Centre of International Studies, Cambridge) and Dr Piers Ludlow 
(LSE, London) for taking part in our Colloquium and presenting two stimulating 
papers, and to Mr Richard Balfe for his interesting talk.  
 
Lucia Faltin, Marion Guiral, 
Linda Risso, George Wilkes  
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Transatlantic policy networks and the founding of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 
1950/51:  Towards a guideline for successful archival 
research 
 
Brigitte Leucht  
 
 
In this paper I propose to develop a guideline for successful archival research. I do 
this from the viewpoint of my PhD. Therefore, the general observations I make 
about archival research derive from the limited viewpoint of one researcher and 
the experience of one project that is still in progress.
1 At the outset, I will provide a 
brief introduction into the subject of the PhD thesis on “Transatlantic policy 
networks and the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 
1950/51”. The focus is on multinational archival research which is an essential 
part of the project. Consequently, I will address a range of issues pertaining to both 
the  selection of archival sources and the realization of  multinational archival 
research.  The paper concludes with the proposed guideline for successful archival 
research.  
 
 
Introduction to the PhD project  
In the PhD thesis, I explore the role of transnational and transatlantic policy 
networks in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 
1950/51. The transnational and transatlantic networks were composed of a variety 
of actors, among them politicians, officials, academic and non-academic experts, 
and others. Ultimately, the thesis will shed new light on how the process of 
European integration was triggered in 1950/51. 
 
The history of early European integration has narrated the Schuman Plan 
negotiations as a multinational conference of European states (e.g. Küsters 1988; 
                                                                        
1 I am working on my PhD at the Centre for European and International Studies, University of 
Portsmouth, under the supervision of Wolfram Kaiser. I am the recipient of a three year bursary by 
the University of Portsmouth which will terminate in September 2006. 
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Lappenküper 1994; Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994). Almost exclusively relying 
on state sources and focusing on intergovernmental bargaining, Milward (1992) 
has developed a comprehensive frame for analysing European integration. 
However, arguing that national governments are the driving force behind 
European integration, his approach to policy development fails to include any 
transnational influences. Other historians (e.g. Kaiser 2005 forthcoming) have 
argued for a transnational approach to studying the history of European integration 
and have promoted the study of transnational networks. To this date, European 
integration historiography has focused on the governmental level of the 
negotiations and has given little attention to the role of individual and collective, 
public and private actors in the period of agenda setting and during the conference. 
At the same time, early European integration history has not incorporated 
satisfactorily the contribution of American actors and networks in the formation of 
the ECSC.  
 
Likewise, the history of transatlantic relations has described the Schuman Plan 
conference in terms of intergovernmental bargaining rather than t ransnational 
cooperation (e.g. Mélandri 1980; Gillingham 1991; Lovett 1996; Schwabe 1988). 
Winand (1993) has surpassed the governmental level and has partly reconstructed 
the “Atlantic network”. However, she does not focus on the Truman period. Other 
works that go beyond the intergovernmental approach deal with individual 
“transatlantic key persons”,  such as  the Frenchman Jean Monnet and the U.S. 
High Commissioner for Germany, John J. McCloy, rather than exploring the 
scope, structures, functioning and impact of transatlantic policy networks in the 
founding of the ECSC (Schwartz 1991; Bird 1993; Brinkley and Hackett 1991; 
Duchêne 1994; Schröder 1994). 
 
Multinational archival research and the PhD project   
The thesis realizes a multinational archival approach, including a variety of public 
and private sources. Archival research entails primary material in publicly 
accessible archives in Germany, the USA, France and Switzerland. Primary 
sources present new actors and establish new connections between individual and 
collective actors. Sources include diaries and journals; official and private 
correspondence; the minutes of meetings and telephone conversations;   7 
organizational charts; membership lists of a given group; lists of delegations, as 
e.g. to a conference; (draft) memoranda and (draft) policy papers such as 
statements of expertise on legal questions. A limited degree of data will be derived 
from interviews with the few remaining survivors of the treaty negotiations.  
 
At this point, I have done some ‘preliminary archival research’. The main bulk of 
archival research will be conducted over the next couple of months (2005). 
Preliminary research has covered, inter alia, the Files for Post-War Europe on the 
Schuman Plan in the British Foreign Office (available on microfilm); the personal 
papers of George W. Ball at the Princeton University Library, Seeley S. Mudd 
Library, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Public Policy Papers 
(http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/); the personal papers of John J. 
McCloy at the  Amherst College Library, Archives and Special Collections 
(http://www.amherst.edu/library/archives/findingaids/);  the personal papers of 
Herbert Blankenhorn and Walter Hallstein at the German Federal Archives in Koblenz 
(http://www.bundesarchiv.de/bestaende_findmittel/index.html); and the personal papers 
of Pierre Uri and Etienne Hirsch at the Historical Archives of the European Union in 
Florence (http://wwwarc.iue.it/dcs/Fonds.html).  
 
Upcoming archival research will include research in public sources and personal papers, 
including  among them, holdings at the  Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe in 
Lausanne ( http://www.jean-monnet.ch/anglais/pArchives/archives.htm); the  Political 
Archives at the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin ( http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/www/en/infoservice/politik/archiv_html);  the  Archives nationales 
(http://www.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/chan/index.html) and the Archives 
du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères in Paris  ( http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/ 
archives/service/inventaires/paris/paris.html);  the  Truman Presidential Library in 
Independence, Missouri (http://www.trumanlibrary.org/collect.htm); the U.S. National 
Archives and Records Administration (http://www.archives.gov/research_room 
/index.html) and  the  Lauinger Library, in W ashington, D.C. 
(http://www.library.georgetown.edu/dept/speccoll/diplo.htm). 
 
To help answer the central research question about the role of transnational and 
transatlantic policy networks in the creation of the ECSC, a set of questions has 
been designed. These questions include the formation of specific networks before 
the Schuman Plan conference; how and to which extent specific networks were 
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responsible for agenda setting; and the problem of which networks were involved 
in the negotiation. Moreover, the questions are informed by methodological tools 
and concepts that have been derived from neighbouring disciplines, including the 
social sciences, and have been tailored to the project. At this point, the research 
agenda for primary sources links to the methodology of the PhD thesis. 
 
To describe the scope, structures, functioning and impact of the transnational and 
transatlantic policy networks at the Schuman Plan conference, the thesis utilizes 
the network concept which was developed within the social sciences. Utilizing the 
network concept to explore the historical dimension of European integration 
entails  borrowing categories and criteria from the three main  analytical 
frameworks that the network concept has produced: policy networks, epistemic 
communities, and advocacy coalitions (Heard-Lauréote 2005). The categories and 
criteria which define these three  approaches support the analysis of primary 
sources. Primary materials guide the privileging of one approach over the other(s).  
 
To study the role of policy networks as facilitators of the transatlantic transfer of 
politico-legal concepts the thesis applies the concept of cultural transfer. Advanced 
since the mid-1980s in France, the concept has been adapted for cultural studies 
and has been used by ethnology, history, literary studies, sociology and pedagogy 
(Espagne 1997). The three components essential to the concept are an original 
culture, actors and/or networks who convey their culture and a target culture. To 
describe what happened at the encounter of different cultures, cultural transfer 
privileges categories like interchange, interaction, translation and dialogue over 
notions of influence or coercion (Mitterbauer 1999). The thesis illustrates the 
transatlantic transfer of politico-legal concepts at the Schuman Plan negotiations in 
the specific policy areas of (a) the institutional set-up and (b) the economic (anti-
trust) provisions of the treaty.  
 
The selection of archival sources  
As I have tried to demonstrate, the selection of archival sources is tied to a number 
of research activities which include assessing secondary literature and some 
primary sources; formulating a central research question and possibly a related set 
of sub-questions; and selecting methodological tools that help answer the research   9 
question(s). Moreover, the selection of archival resources entails a number of 
‘intellectual concerns’ which cover further conceptual as well as epistemological 
issues.  
 
Having sketched the selection of archival sources for the PhD project, I would like 
to take a step back and ask whether the project could be realized without 
multinational archival research. One could argue that research can draw on plenty 
of secondary literature and some published primary material. Moreover, the source 
material described is no longer subject to the thirty-year rule that applies to most 
public archival sources. Of course, most of the primary materials pertaining to the 
Schuman Plan conference have not been published and probably never will be. I 
am thinking, for example, of the voluminous holdings of the West German 
Sekretariat für Fragen des Schuman Plans. Although selected documents have 
been reproduced in editions dealing with the sources of European Union law (e.g. 
Schulze/Hoeren 1999), the main bulk of documents remains to be read in the 
Political Archives of the German Foreign Office in Berlin 
(http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/infoservice/politik/archiv_html) by 
historians with a specific interest in the formation of the ECSC. Whereas some 
governmental sources are edited and published, portions of the personal papers of 
individual actors are only published when these actors are assigned “crucial 
importance”. The actors whose papers are explored for this project, however, were 
often not known to the general public in 1950/51. To this date, only a few of the 
actors have been introduced to the history of European integration and the history 
of transatlantic relations alike. The  actor-oriented approach of this project, 
combining the network concept with the cultural transfer concept, has suggested a 
new reading of governmental sources and personal papers. At the same time, it has 
encouraged the investigation of sources hitherto unexplored for the history of 
European integration and post-WW II transatlantic relations. Moreover, the 
reconstruction of transnational networks necessitates the exploration of sources in 
more than one state. In short, the answer is “no, this project cannot be realized 
without multinational archival research”.  
 
In addition to justifying the necessity for multinational archival research, I would 
like to take a moment to reflect on why historians use archival sources and more 
generally, primary sources, in the first place. In addition to providing the answers 
to research questions, primary sources fulfil a specific function. Referring to a past 
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reality, primary sources provide the means to create ‘historic truth’. However 
simple it may seem, it is worth recalling that primary sources are only traces of the 
past and that historians select from the remaining traces to create historical 
evidence (Jenkins 1991). In their written accounts, historians construct a narrative 
out of the traces, they represent traces and put them under quotation marks. With 
quotation marks historians create the impression of authenticity in a non-narrative 
way. Describing this process, Carlo Ginzburg has coined the  notion  of the 
historian as an eye-witness (Ginzburg 1990). These reflections touch on history as 
a professional discipline. More specifically, they link our ideas of the past to the 
practice of empirical research (methods) and the form in which the findings of 
empirical research are presented (writing history).
2   
  
The realization of multinational archival research 
Realizing multinational archival research entails a number of ‘pragmatic concerns’ 
which include, among others, locating archival holdings, negotiating access to 
archival resources, funding of archival research and copying relevant materials. In 
outlining pragmatic concerns, I am also addressing the potential problems  and 
pitfalls of realizing a multinational archival research scheme.  
 
Locating archival holdings: In locating archival sources, historians rely on 
secondary literature, editions of published primary sources and printed archival 
guides. Once a collection has been tracked, the archive’s website often holds 
additional information on the size of the holdings, rules of access, potential access 
restrictions, and so forth. The quality of archival websites and online finding aids 
varies, as does the amount of information found on the websites. Another 
possibility to gain additional information on archival holdings is to contact 
established experts in the field as well as other postgraduate researchers who 
sometimes might even know the name of the archivist best to c ontact with a 
specific research question. 
 
Then again, web sites can function as the starting point to locate primary source 
material. Recommended sites for the history of European integration are, for 
example:   
                                                                        
2 The categories are derived from Rüsen (1983).    11
1.  The Electronic resources on European integration, collected by Richard 
Griffiths at the Leiden University History Department: http://www.eu-
history.leidenuniv.nl/ (2004). 
2.  The World Wide Web Virtual Library European Integration History 
Index maintained by the EUI (European University Institute) in 
Florence: http://vlib.iue.it/hist-eur-integration/Index.html 
Another useful site is Mark Trachtenberg’s online ‘practical guide’ to Cold War 
history (2004). Although focusing on the U.S. American side of primary sources, 
the guide contains valuable links and inside-reviews of major (national) archives 
on both sides of the Atlantic: http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/ 
guide/guidehome.html 
 
As to an evaluation of locating archival sources for the PhD project, I have been 
successful in tracking governmental sources and the personal papers of public 
actors. However, I have encountered difficulties in locating the personal papers of 
less-known individual actors, including experts to the treaty negotiations.  
 
Negotiating access to archival sources: Once archival holdings have been located, 
access can usually be negotiated. Certainly, this applies to a project dealing with 
1950/51. In my experience, permission to access holdings is less of a problem than 
locating holdings. Again, governmental sources are to be distinguished from the 
personal papers of actors. Sometimes, actors who are still alive have transferred 
their papers to archives, but retain the right to grant permission to individual 
researchers. At times, archives require a letter of support by the academic 
supervisor. Individual documents that are marked ‘classified’ often can be 
examined, too, after special permission has been granted on-site. Crucial to getting 
access permission as well as more specific information about holdings is the 
correspondence and the communication with archivists. Here, potential language 
barriers can be problematic for researchers who might have a passive or reading 
knowledge of a language, but find the active use of a language difficult. 
 
Funding archival research: Lack of (sufficient) funding is probably the only real 
barrier to realizing a multinational archival research scheme. The possibility and 
necessity to procure (internal and/or external) grants to cover or, at least, help 
defray expenses is part of every project entailing multinational archival research. 
In fact, a research project based on multinational archival research requires the 
  12
developing of a systematic strategy for procuring grant income. Although 
information on sources is available, mostly online, getting an overview of the 
funding opportunities for an individual researcher and an individual project is 
piecemeal work. To explore potential funding possibilities, one has to have an 
advanced concept for the project. B efore submitting applications, researchers 
should have a clear understanding of the eligibility criteria and the requirements of 
the application and always mind the deadlines. Of the common eligibility criteria, 
the citizenship requirement might be an obstacle for EU students and even more 
so, for international students, who are applying for funding in the UK (e.g. when 
applying for grants with binational organizations).  
 
Copying relevant materials: Information on potential copy limits usually is 
available on the archival websites. The archives of the European Union in 
Florence, for example, have fairly strict copy limits on microfiche/-film holdings 
from governmental sources from EU member states. Copying relevant materials 
requires being able to evaluate what is important and entails asking the “right” 
questions. Therefore, a central research question and a related set of sub-questions 
one poses to the archival documents are important to successful archival research. 
Of course, any set of questions will have to be fine-tuned in the course of archival 
research. 
 
The proposed guideline for successful archival research 
The proposed guideline for successful archival research represents an attempt to 
generalize the specific observations made in connection with my PhD topic and its 
multinational archival research scheme. The guideline comprises four 
recommendations which postgraduate researchers might find helpful in their 
pursuit of (multinational) archival research.   
 
1.  Take a ‘holistic’ approach to archival research.  
 
A ‘holistic’ approach to archival research necessitates looking at the whole process 
of doing a PhD and writing a PhD thesis, rather than discussing archival research 
as an isolated activity. Looking at archival research from a holistic perspective 
means first, being aware of the fact that archival research is tied to a whole set of 
research activities and second, being able to place archival research within the set 
of related and interdependent research activities. Research activities include,   13
among others, visiting conferences; writing and giving conference papers; (if 
possible) publishing papers, articles, encyclopaedia entries; participating in- or 
organizing peer groups; and so forth.  
 
2.  Focus on the research activities which are linked to composing the PhD 
thesis. 
 
Among the research activities related to the PhD process, there are a number of 
activities that are more or less directly linked to composing the thesis. Research 
activities cover the assessment of secondary literature and select primary 
resources; the formulation of a central research question and a related set of sub-
questions; and the selection of methodological tools. Next to selecting archival 
sources these research activities help d evelop a research agenda for primary 
sources to be examined. 
 
 
3.  Maintain a timetable for archival research.  
 
When mapping out research activities and their interrelationship, it is crucial to 
apply them to a timetable. Time management is essential to successful archival 
research. Time management relates to all aspects of archival research ranging from 
the intellectual concerns (conceptual and epistemological concerns) to the 
pragmatic concerns involved in writing a PhD thesis.  
 
4.  Manage the challenges of multinational archival research.  
 
A discussion of the pragmatic concerns pertaining to archival research has pointed 
to a number of potential problems and pitfalls. It is important to realize that the 
challenges and potential pitfalls of multinational archival research cannot always 
be avoided, but they can be managed. 
 
A final remark: In their monographs, historians do not acknowledge the problems 
of archival research. Rather, in prefaces, reference is made to helpful archivists 
and generous grant awarding bodies. Professional conduct has it that the problems 
related to archival research are best discussed informally, for example, during 
small talk at conferences, frequently over lunch or dinner. Maybe the HEIRS 
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colloquia and workshops can contribute to moving the discussion on the 
challenges of archival research from the lunch and dinner table to the conference 
table. 
Brigitte Leucht 
University of Portsmouth 
brigitte.leucht@port.ac.uk  
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The Illusion of the Neutral Time 
Tracing back the underlying premises of eastward enlargement 
through interviews and archival sources  
 
Cristina Blanco Sío-López 
“Every island announced  
By whom acts as the lookout 
Is always Eldorado 
That Destiny promises; 
Imagination 
That, preparing its orgy, 
Sees merely a reef 
With the sun of the morning”
1 
 
 
When I first approached primary sources dealing with the Eastward Enlargement 
of the EU, especially those elaborated by EU institutions during the decade of the 
nineties, I repeatedly observed the presence of a special emphasis on the idea that 
the end of the Cold War opened a new era, a time full of historic opportunities in 
which peace, stability and prosperity would finally be possible in what they 
denominated a “Pan-European Union”
2. This idea also entailed the presence of a 
very particular perception of time that I have decided to name Illusion of the 
Neutral Time and which I will immediately define.  
If  ways of living time are supposed to influence ways of delivering political 
messages and ways of understanding a historical period, then the perception of 
witnessing a turning point in History, eliminating the bitter confrontations that 
characterised the post Second World War architecture, must have had some 
                                                                        
1 Baudelaire, C. Les fleurs du mal, translated by Dillon, G. (1936), Flowers of Evil. 
New York: Harper and Brothers, p. 174. 
2 For a new reflection about the idea of a “Pan-European Union” see Dinan, D. 
(2004) Europe Recast: A History of the European Union. Boulder (Colorado, USA): 
Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.   17
determinant role in the way that the decision of the EU to enlarge to the Central 
and Eastern European Countries
3 (CEECs) was specifically promoted.  
To analyse this question, whether the nineties implied a real change in any sense is 
not important, only the perception that it was true, at least for a short lapse of time. 
Therefore, if the political actors of that period, perceived that the time they were 
living, the post-communist landscape the nineties, was something absolutely 
distinctive, a time of new chances and expectations, this will surely be reflected in 
the way they communicate this political project to the citizenry. 
Coming now to the definition of the earlier mentioned perception of time, I should 
say that what I call Illusion of the Neutral Time
4 (INT) can be defined as an 
impression of being before an authentic point of departure which, after the analysis 
of the previous guidelines and time-patterns, would decide to go towards the 
implementation of the most desirable realities in human and ethical terms. It is also 
an impression of observing reality from a timeless watchtower, from which the 
observer believes he has objective and even definitive criteria about the preceding 
times and feels the turning point is being lived distinctive, new, challenging and 
full of tangible hopes in contrast with any obscure past.  
It is not a reality, neutral times do not exist. It would be enough to think about the 
terrible war in the ex-Yugoslavia during the nineties to reject any possibility of 
considering this period hopeful at all. So, this perception of time exists only as an 
illusion, as a blind moment of emotion and belief in a changing context, for it is 
typical of any transition period in History, not only of the decade of the nineties. It 
is a moment in which the dreamt future is thought to become our continuous 
present due to the new positive commitments and formulations. 
The term illusion has a twofold meaning, first of all, it means the enthusiastic hope 
for the future and, secondly, the quality of intermittent mirage that, in the light of 
the events will see its brilliance erased and its falsity unveiled. 
On the other hand, the term neutral makes reference to a deliberate cancellation of 
the constraints and peculiar characteristics of a particular period in the relevant 
documentation and a deliberate lack of allusions to ideological attachments in 
favour of an absolute positive approach in which all, without exclusion, will 
                                                                        
3 CEECs from now onwards. 
4 INT from now onwards  
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benefit from Enlargement, as it is supposed to be the only guarantee for the future 
peace, stability and progress of Europe, as is constantly repeated. 
The significance of the context of the nineties lies in the fact that, as Manuel 
Castells reminds us, “Communism and the Soviet Union, and the reactions against 
them observable around the world, marked the different societies, internationally, 
during the last century. However, that powerful empire and its mythology 
disintegrated in a few years, in one of the most extraordinary examples of 
unexpected historical change. This is the end of a historical era”
5. The same 
interpretation of the nineties as a time of creation propitious for the feeling of an 
INT is also shared by Marinella Neri Gualdesi, who maintained that “the nineties 
mark the present at its creation. In this context, the only thing that seems obvious is 
the growing power of attraction of the EU, which is supposed to represent a 
picture of hope. In actual fact, Europe entered the decade of the nineties with the 
Community of Twelve as the main factor of stability and a model of reconciliation 
and economic prosperity, which transformed it in the object of attraction for the 
Eastern part of the continent, which is now-after the rupture of 1989-rediscovering 
its sense of belonging to Europe”
6. 
In this particular paper, I will focus on the views which sprang from the European 
Commission during the decade of the nineties through the interviews I was 
conducting in my different research missions in Brussels. The actors on which I 
will  concentrate for this study, will be mainly officials of the European 
Commission who conducted the first accession negotiations, who wrote the texts 
of the main agreements to make Eastward Enlargement become a reality and 
designed the main documents for the divulgation of this project, seen and sold as a 
“re-unification of Europe”. This seems to be something finally achieved after long 
decades of artificial divisions during the Cold War, as they emphasise in their epic 
accounts of the whole Eastward Enlargement process. I should specify that the 
written documents that I have compared and contrasted with the testimonies of the 
interviews were mainly consulted in the DG Enlargement archives, as they had not 
                                                                        
5 Castells, M. (1998) The Information Age. Economy, Society and Culture. Volume 
III: End of Millennium. Cambridge (MA): Blackwell Publishers Inc., p. 26. 
6 Neri Gualdesi, M. “The EU between the United States and the Changing Eastern 
situation” in Varsori, A. (1995) Europe 1945-1990s. The End of an Era? Basinstoke: 
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already been transferred to the Archives of the European Commission, due to their 
recent dates of publication
7.  
 
I will, then, analyse how influential this particular perception of time, the INT, was 
to shape the promotion of such challenging policy, the Eastward Enlargement of 
the EU, or if this perception of time was, on the other hand, a product of the 
policies themselves through the myth-making processes of an specially epic 
diffusion of ideas. That is, if the INT was an instrument or a product of that kind of 
documentation
8. However, my initial hypothesis is that the perception of an INT 
marked one of the main orientations in the ways of promoting Enlargement, an 
idea that is the fruit of a convergence of interests and needs both by the EU and the 
CEECs, as I will later detail. 
The so-called “Return to Europe” slogan can be considered as one of the main 
manifestations of an INT in the nineties because the deliberate epic rhetoric of the 
European documentation of this period makes a special reference to the fact that 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the definitive moment has arrived to end-up with 
the unnatural Cold-War divide and to start a new European path of unity and 
harmony. The CEECs would be, according to this view, coming back to the 
original European matrix and this is the great idealist dream for the new century. 
The decade of the nineties would be the soil for the new roots of Europe. The 
presence of an INT in the sources is, in any case, an assumption that is to be 
contrasted and verified through the sources themselves. 
As the main methodological approach I have decided to use Discourse Analysis, 
but in a way that is limited to which Alfred Schutz denominated the “level of 
relevance”
9. I will look for relevant manifestations of an Illusion of the Neutral 
Time through documents related to the Enlargement process to see to what extent 
this form of living time was an instrument or a consequence of the context of 
change of the nineties at the EU level. 
Taking discourse as language in action, this methodology tries to unveil the 
underlying intentions of those who design what should be thought, inducing us, by 
                                                                        
7 The DG Enlargement of the European Commission in Brussels holds recent documents 
that might be consulted through the application for the special permission for documents 
younger than thirty years. http://europa.eu.int/historical_archives/index_en.htm.  
8 Schutz, A. in Weiss, G. and Wodak, R. (2003) Critical Discourse Analysis. Theory 
and Interdisciplinarity. Basinstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 5-6. 
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means of prescriptive communication, to apprehend concepts like the “Return to 
Europe” slogan and take them to be true.  To do this, I will make use of the 
following principles of Discourse Analysis: 
Discourse is not pure content, but “a window to someone's mental or social 
world”
10, so it could be useful to shed light on the priorities and objectives of the 
designers of the Eastward Enlargement of the EU. The reality constructed by the 
documents, the “Return to Europe” slogan, in this case, is naturalised through 
discourse and presented as “the way things are”.  
It is not any one instance but “repetition of the same pattern in a systematic way, in 
many instances and occasions that naturalizes a particular view of Reality”
11. So, it 
will be necessary to see different kinds of primary sources regarding Enlargement 
to observe to what extent the case of “Return to Europe” slogan propagation is 
presented with a relevant frequency. The examination of relevant self-explanatory 
examples of text and conversation to interpret a regular patter is a direct 
commitment of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and that is why I have decided 
to use it. 
CDA’s basic argument elaborated by Hutchby and Wooffitt narrows down to the 
statement that “it is not the case that designers of a guideline are simply imparting 
information to a passive recipient when they communicate, but they are actively 
constructing their accounts for a certain kind of recipient in a particular 
situation”
12. A very interesting relationship between the development of CDA and 
research projects being elaborated about the decade of the nineties has been 
suggested by Norman Fairclough:  
“In the nineties the social and political order established after the Second World 
War changed radically and irrevocably with the fall of communism; the end of the 
Cold War; a new liberal consensus based on liberal democracy and free market, 
which became a model for non-capitalist institutions like universities…; an 
information revolution and so on. These changes also influenced the way people 
                                                                        
10 Cameron, D. (2001) Working with Spoken Discourse. London: Sage Publications, 
p. 43. 
11  Wilkinson, H. (1995) “Discourse Analysis: A Critical View”.  Language and 
Literature. No. 4 (3), p. 157. 
12 Hutchby,  I. and Woofit, R. (1998)  Conversation Analysis: An Introduction. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 19.  
13 Fairclough, N. (1995) Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Longman, p. 128. 
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and institutions communicate, because we have passed from an informational to a 
promotional discourse”
13 . It is meaningful to realise, then, that the “Return to 
Europe” slogan is the example of the “from tell to sell turn in discourse”
14, as it 
entails an incorporation of the genre of commercial advertising into non-
commercial genres of features.  
On the other hand, it should be taken into account that we are dealing with 
Institutional Discourse, which is always a goal oriented one that paves the way for 
the generation of an expected acceptance, contributing to the appearance of a 
monopoly of the legitimate discourse by the EU Documentation of the nineties
15. 
In this sense, the so-called “Return to Europe” slogan can be considered as one of 
the main manifestations of an INT in the nineties because the deliberate epic 
rhetoric of the European documentation of this period makes a special reference to 
the fact that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the definitive moment has arrived to 
end the unnatural Cold-War divide and to start a new European path of unity and 
harmony. The CEECs would be, according to this view, coming back to the 
original European matrix. The “Return to Europe” slogan, would be, therefore, 
one of the essential underlying premises in the promotion of Eastward 
Enlargement and that is why I found it absolutely necessary to explore the origins 
of such discourse in order to understand how old objectives have been awaken 
with different motivations but with the same direction, both in the CEECs and at 
the EU level.  
Concerning my main sources, I would like to make a special reference to 
interviews and to the different types I used in my analysis. First of all, the open-
ended interview “which consists of asking key respondents about their insights on 
certain events an ideas and use such propositions as basis for further enquiry”
16. I 
have combined that type of interview with the so-called focused interview that 
“follows the same set of questions in all interviews to be able to compare the 
results afterwards, departing from the same parameters. In the focused interview 
all the questions should be carefully worded so that the interviewer appears 
                                                                        
 
 
14 Ibid. 
15 For the development of these ideas see Delcourt, B. (2003) Droit et Souveranités. 
Analyse critique du discourse européen sur la Yugoslavie. Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter 
Lang, pp. 15-39. 
16 Yin, R.K. (1984) Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Beverly Hills, CA: 
Sage Publications, p. 84-85.  
  22
genuinely naïve about the topic to allow the respondent to provide a fresh 
commentary about it”. However, it is important to bear in mind that the interviews 
should be compared and contrasted with written sources of corroboratory 
evidence, between which I would quote speeches, Europe agreements, official 
documents and declarations, Commission’s reports, etc. 
At this stage, I have gathered the most relevant documentation regarding the EU 
Institutions views on Enlargement, with a special focus on the “Return to Europe” 
slogan, even though I would need to complete the set of interviews to be later 
compared. In any case, since the second part of my thesis deals with the German 
views on Enlargement, I still need to work more on this side despite the fact that I 
have already been interviewing and consulting documents at the Bundestag, the 
Commission Permanent Representation in Berlin, the German Permanent 
Representation in Brussels and the Chancellery. I am now in the second year of 
my PhD. and I would need about two more years in order to finish my thesis. 
The discourse of the “Return to Europe” slogan was born between the years 1949 
and 1952, and it is the fruit of the conclusions of the meetings of those Eastern 
European intellectuals in exile living in London or Paris, who were members of 
the European Movement, where they acted as representatives of their respective 
countries as part of the Central and Eastern European Section of the European 
Movement, whose deposits are to be found in HAEC
17. In December 1946, in 
Paris, Henri Brugmans, Principal of the College of Europe, promoted the creation 
of the European Union of Federalists and declared that the fact of not being able to 
have the collaboration of the CEECs, dominated by the Soviet Union was an 
enormous tragedy. He stated that they would have to start the  process of 
integration of the Old Continent without the CEECs, but hoped they would be able 
to integrate them as soon as the political circumstances permitted it. Therefore, he 
decided to give voice to those Eastern European intellectuals in the exile who had 
left their countries very early at the beginning of the soviet domination. The actual 
implementation of this integrating will was the creation of the Section of Studies 
about the CEECs in Strasbourg in 1949, to support the so-called “captive 
nations”
18 which would hopefully soon return to Europe, “to end an unnatural 
division in order to converge in the common European culture and heritage”
19.  
                                                                        
17 Historical Archives of the European Communities in Florence. 
18 This term firstly appeared in “Mouvement Européen. Section Pays de l’Europe 
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These intellectuals
20 reacted, in the first moments of the Cold War to the 
impression of their countries being kidnapped and deprived of their signs of 
identity, which they regarded as part of the Western European mainstream
21. Since 
that founding moment, the Eastern European intellectuals in exile were 
developing, within the already mentioned international meetings, very concrete 
plans to eventually leave the Soviet sphere and be linked to Western Europe. 
Between those plans, we can find ideas which really fill the EU contemporary 
agenda, like the creation of a European citizenship and a European Convention of 
Human R ights, with special care for political exiles, immigrants and 
refugees
22.The Conference about the CEECs, held in London in 1952, was firstly 
organised by the members of the European Movement to talk about the oppression 
and lack of liberties in their respective countries, and led, finally, to establish the 
need for an integrated Western Europe, with a common market and an appropriate 
supranational body of institutions. They hoped that at the right moment for the 
liberation of their countries it would be advanced enough so that the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe could participate in it as soon as possible
23. 
Despite all these outcries, and, as Pérez Sánchez has affirmed, “after the revisionist 
fallacy of 1953 and the military intervention in Hungary in 1956, the status quo of 
the bipolar division established after the Second World War was perpetuated till 
                                                                                                                                                        
d’Études des Pays de l’Est. Strasbourg, le 17 Août 1949”. ME-875 (ASCE : Archivi 
Storici delle Comunità Europee). 
19 Ibid. 
20 To see the complete lists with the names and surnames, country by country, of all 
these intellectuals, who acted as representatives of Central and Eastern Europe in the 
Meetings of the European Movement both in London and Paris, please refer to the 
following Minutes of the Meetings of the Eastern and Central European Section of 
the European Movement, to be found at the Historical Archives of the European 
Communities in Florence. All in ME-875 (ASCE)  
21 See Edgar Morin in Morin, E. (1994) Pensar Europa. Barcelona: Gedisa, p. 58. 
22 Text de la Note a soumettre a Strasbourg a M. Paul-Henri Spaak, President de la 
Asamblee Consultative, par une Delegation de la Section des Pays de l’ Europe 
Central et Oriental, Movement Europeen. Commission d’etudes politiques: Section 
Pays de l’Europe Central et Orientale, Procès-Verbal  de la réunion du 17 Juin, 1950 
p. 512 in ME-875 (ASCE). 
23 European Movement. Central and Eastern European Commission, Conference on 
Central and Eastern Europe: Resolutions (20
th-24
th January, 1952, Church House, 
London) 27 pp., ARCHIV. HADOC.2027 in ASCE.  
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the beginning of the nineties when the question of returning to Europe was opened 
again”
24.  
As we can observe in the above guidelines, the previously  mentioned plans 
developed at that time sound really near to the events of our present and there is a 
very precise explanation for that. Most politicians of the CEECs, who were 
making an effort, at the beginning of the transition, to transform the “Return to 
Europe” slogan into a reality, have recovered all the ideas of those Eastern 
Europeans intellectuals in the exile and used them to elaborate their political 
programmes, as Pérez Sánchez
25 has demonstrated. With the integration of those 
ideas into the domestic agendas of the CEECs in the nineties, we enter the second 
channel of the circulation of the ideas about the reunification of Europe: The 
recovery of the “Return to Europe” slogan to by the CEECs, which was one of the 
main means of legitimisation by the new political elites. 
The allusions to the “Return to Europe” slogan in this realm are abundant
26, 
however, there is a lack in the historiography regarding the use of the very same 
slogan by the European Commission also in the decade of the nineties. This is still 
unexplored territory and that is why I consider it  interesting and necessary to shed 
light on the progressive adoption of this slogan also by the EU institutions, as they 
develop a parallel discourse to that of the CEECs and for the same policy, the 
project of Eastward Enlargement of the EU. 
I will deal now with the uses of the “Return to Europe” slogan by the European 
Commission, trying to explain why the Commission decided to show solidarity or 
take control of this discourse recovered by the CEECs in the nineties during their 
respective transitions and strengthened when they firstly applied for EU 
membership. I will show, then, that there is a convergence of ways of feeling time 
and of understanding political change in the nineties, in the way o f a final 
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opportunity to implement the above mentioned dreams of a united Europe. In few 
words, I will show that there was a convergence of an INT, both in the CEECs and 
in the expressions of the relevant actors at the level of the European Commission. 
It is important to bear in mind that it was the CEECs governments that raised the 
issue of membership and constantly keep pushing the Community for an explicit 
commitment to this goal. Although the Commission proposed the negotiation of 
association agreements in February 1990, it sought to avoid any reference to future 
accession. In its communication to the Council in 1990, the Commission stated 
clearly that the associations “in no way represent a sort of membership 
antechamber. Membership will not be excluded when the time comes, but for the 
moment being, this is a totally separate question”
27. During the commencement of 
the negotiations with the CEECs, the EC agreed to a formula mentioning their 
future membership but only went so far “as to recognise membership as the 
associates, but not as the Community’s final objective”
28. 
 
Such association agreements correspond to those described by Mathias Ruete: “In 
1989 I actually wrote that the model we should follow with regards to the CEECs 
was that of the OEEC
29. I thought we should create just some kind of currency 
union with them. You should bear in mind that we were confronted with German 
unification at that time. And, regarding the main arguments to enlarge, I remember 
also at that time, very curiously, there was a huge fear that, especially as far as 
infrastructures was concerned…but, everything else, the CEECs would become an 
American culture”
30. In any case, and with regard to the “Return to Europe” 
slogan he stated that “it was more than a communication strategy, we genuinely 
believed. The CEECs belong to the EU and we had to do everything to stabilise 
these countries economically but also politically”
31. 
This view contrasts with the opinion of Eneko Landaburu, the former Director-
General of the DG Enlargement of the European Commission: 
                                                                        
27 Europe 5185, 2
nd of February 1990, p. 2.  
28 Torreblanca Payá, J. I. (1997) The European Community and Central Eastern 
Europe (1989-1993): Foreign Policy and Decision-Making. Madrid: Centro de 
Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, pp. 40-41. 
29 Organisation for European Economic Co-operation. 
30 Interview with Mathias Ruete, held on the 2
nd of February 2004 at the DG 
Enlargement of the European Commission.  
31 Ibid. 
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“There is no reunification of Europe because Europe has never been united. There 
were only hegemonic unions, like those carried out by Hitler or by the Roman 
Empire, always imposing a partial view over a totality. That is why the EU is a 
complete success because it is the counterpart of the European traumatic past and 
those countries which enter the European club enter also democracy, a social state 
of law an the opportunities of stabilisation”
32. 
On the other hand, Manuel Arnal Monreal has also affirmed that the “Return to 
Europe” slogan is both “a way of attracting the support of the European citizens to 
the project of Enlargement and the will of starting a new era of political relations 
with the CEECs. Because the real aim of Enlargement is to overcome, definitely, 
the History of Europe, which has been the history of confrontation and war. In any 
case, at the political level, we could say no to the CEECs. There wasn’t other 
choice except going back to the past and closing the gates of History”
33. 
After the EC had been extremely cautious not to commit itself to CEECs 
membership in the association negotiations, the Conclusions of the Presidency at 
the Lisbon European Council in June 1992 started to definitely change that initial 
position and put the issue of CEECs Enlargement firmly on the agenda. Hence, the 
Commission’s report to the European Council, created by the First Task Force on 
Eastern Enlargement stated that “the principle of a Union open to European states 
that aspire to full participation and who fulfil the conditions for membership is a 
fundamental element of the European construction and the integration of these 
new democracies into the European family represents a historic opportunity”
34. 
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that, if Enlargement did not become a specific 
goal of the Commission until 1992, the “Return to Europe” slogan had already 
been adopted in the communication strategy of the Commission with the CEECs 
since 1989. It was born as a way of showing solidarity to the CEECs and as a way 
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of speaking the same language in a metaphoric sense, showing that they did 
identify with these countries. But, as Eastward Enlargement was not yet decided in 
1989, this slogan was not more than the recognition, at the level of institutional 
discourse, that Enlargement could become an eventual reality and that the attitude 
of the EC was to remain open to help and assist the CEECs, however, they did not 
talk about integration
35. 
 
Conclusion 
The concluding remarks of this paper are based on a reciprocal response to the 
realisation of a sudden and irrevocable change in the nineties, with the end of the 
Cold War division of Europe. The “Return to Europe” slogan was firstly 
revitalised by the CEECs, whose new political elites go back to the discourses of 
the past, namely to the explicit enunciation of truncated dreams by the Central and 
Eastern European intellectuals in the exile who were members of the European 
Movement.  
The response of the actors and designers of the Enlargement process at  the 
European Commission to the call of the CEECs started with prudence at the 
beginning of the nineties, refusing to commit themselves to what they considered 
eventually inevitable but still not desirable as they were engaged in the difficulties 
of the deepening at home, namely with the Maastricht Treaty and the single 
market. So, in the very first moments after the fall of the Berlin Wall the “Return 
to Europe” slogan was certainly used by the EU institutions but merely to show 
solidarity and support to the CEECs by means of speaking the same language, of 
using the same political discourse as the other riverside. However, first outlined at 
the Lisbon Meeting of the European Council and then irreversibly formulated in 
the Copenhagen criteria, the “Return to Europe” slogan turned out to be much than 
a tranquilising gesture of solidarity to the CEECs. It became a true convergence, a 
true reciprocal use of political discourses. Enlargement seems to be, then, 
interesting for both parts the new and progressive reinforcement of the “Return to 
Europe” slogan from 1993 at the EU was also the sign that a convergence of ways 
of understanding historical time was real and thus a coincidence in the shared 
impression of an INT during the decade of the nineties, a now or never window of 
opportunity that could be either crossed then or closed forever, making Europe 
return to the shadows of confrontation, despair and inequality. 
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Last but not least, we could argue that, if the identification of the political 
discourse was possible it was also due to the integration of the truncated memories 
in the horizons of potentiality of the Eastward Enlargement of the EU, to the 
convergence of the same perception of time, the INT, in both sides and to the 
understanding of History as the occasional realm of opportunity.  
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The Relevance of a Historical Pattern of Political 
Management : Romanian Party System Europeanisation. 
 
Dr. Sorina Soare 
 
 
1. General overview 
 
By analysing Europe’s progressive rediscover in Romania, this study 
encompass parties as essential ingredients in terms of comprehension of 
both the pre- and post-accession periods. Although there is an absence of 
any sceptical discourse on Europe and EU integration enjoys high social 
support, Romanian parties are incapable of grasping the real issues of the 
enlargement p rocess. The idealistic image of the EU integration process 
emphasized by the Romanian parties feeds an important social dismay in 
front of the economic and social direct consequences of the post-accession 
period. The alienation of the population from the EU integration and the 
consequent post-integration democratic deficit (Agh 2004) can therefore 
become a sheer reality for the Romanian political elite. In other words, since 
the Romanian political elite does not want to assume any debate about EU 
integration, they can easily be challenged by those actors who haven’t been 
granted access to this process: the wide society, populist anti-establishment 
movements, etc. 
 
In this context, I would like to capture an important aspect in the 
development of post-1989 Romania, the limited correlation between official 
consensus about EU and a stable integration process. Thus, this paper lay 
emphasis on the potential of democratic deficit of the Romanian integration 
process as a direct consequence of an elite-based process of Europeanisation 
“through which contacts have been established with Western parties and 
party internationals” without a complementary internal Europeanisation as a 
internal mass-based process (Agh 2004: 22). More specifically, by using EU 
identities and  norms only in an instrumental logic, Romanian political 
parties emphasise exclusively an external Europeanisation. Consequently, 
the Romanian consensus on EU hides important social, economic and 
political tensions. In addition, the Romanian parties are thus caught in a 
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rhetorical trap that forces them to approve the enlargement in order to 
acquire a systemic reputation or an externally delivered proof of attachment 
to democracy. Thus, the hypothesis of this paper considers this consensus as 
an  ex ante construction, a proof of democratic stability for the external 
institutions (by Western observers such as the EU but also NATO, IMF, 
etc.) and not an  ex post  concept built on several national solved 
compromises. The European consensus is only a veil drawn over important 
social conflicts that can undermine the institutional structure of a new 
democracy. 
 
In order to summarize the theoretical framework of this analysis, note 
should be taken that the current investigation deals with a general 
methodological basis,  commonplace in the literature that international 
factors matter in designing democracy (Whitehead 1996, Zielonka and 
Pravda 2001). Thus, I intend to identify a crisis potential as a result of an 
incomplete European consensus, the main source of fragility i n the 
integration process. 
 
2. Europeanisation’s conceptual frameworks 
The analysis of how Europeanisation acts generally focuses on different 
trajectories. For the scholars of the democratic transition, Europeanisation 
implies a necessary convergence between the new democracies and the old 
Member States. And the long-standing cleavage between the Old and New 
Members usually portrays the difficulties of a regional Europeanisation in 
depth. On the other hand, the European studies perspective emphasizes the 
different ways in which EU influences the national political systems. This 
perspective aims at explaining the convergence/divergence between a 
harmonized Europeanised system and specific national systems. But these 
large theoretical boundaries do not allow a clearer comprehension of what 
the effects of this process are. Consequently, it should be emphasized that 
the path of this process is best understood at three levels of analysis: (1) its 
definition, (2) the identification of the change and of its mechanisms and, 
finally, (3) the scope and direction of change. Underlying the distinction 
between these three levels may contribute to avoid the teleological 
connotation inherent when interpreting the status of new democracies in   33
terms of comparison with the models established by the older democracies 
in the West. 
 
2.1. Definition 
By paying closer attention to the various aspects of the  Europeanisation 
concept and following a European studies perspective, Olsen underlined its 
fashionable but also contested character (2002). Therefore, for some 
authors, such as Kassim (2000), talking about Europeanisation has no real 
utility due to the lack of organizing capacity of the concept. But, as Olsen 
suggests, these critics are not relevant  per se due to the fact that 
Europeanisation “is not an unique process and a sui generis phenomenon”, 
thus “the argument is that different conceptions of Europeanisation 
complement, rather than exclude, each other. They refer to different but 
related phenomena” (2002: 922-3). In this paper, I shall limit the theoretical 
perspective to the Europeanisation as a sectoral approach of a system of 
governance, limited to a regional perspective and centrally concerned with 
the consolidation/exportation of a democratic model of political 
management, as mentioned by the transition studies perspective. Therefore, 
“the key question here is to what extent and in what ways the political 
systems of the member states have been transformed under the influence of 
EU integration” (Goetz 2001: 1036). 
 
2.2. Mechanisms and changes 
Having established that Europeanisation portrays a source of change at a 
domestic level, it is important to assess the impact of this change. Thus, the 
remaining question concerns the identification of the items of this 
environment of changes. And, in this paper, I am specifically interested in 
the changes registered at the level of the political party system. In this 
general sub-field, I will try to pay particular attention to the context in which 
parties operate with EU actors, such as the European federations of parties, 
“non-official channels for networking in favour of EU accession” (Pridham 
2001: 192). In this area, by following a classic agreement (Smith 1993: 9), 
the main pattern of institutional development of the political parties in the 
region follows an “evolutionary leap”. Accordingly, parties would miss out 
several classic stages of development. This leap is managed partially by EU 
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party federation and their respective Internationals: an external 
Europeanisation. Sloam (2003 apud Agh 2004: 22) describe this process as a 
three level mechanism of ideational transfer, policy transfer and 
informational transfer.  
 
Similarly, Pridham portrays the European parties’ federations as the 
managers of the national parties’ compliance with the democratic rule of law 
or as “important channels whereby democratic practices and procedures may 
be encouraged” (Pridham 1999: 1222). Still “so far external Europeanisation 
has only scratched the surface” of the Central and European parties (Sloam, 
Ibidem). And from this point of view, joining individually EU federation is 
not a proof of successful Europeanisation while there isn’t an indispensable 
complementary direction of change: an Internal Europeanisation. The lack 
of changes promoted by the parties membership or their social basis, the 
superficial implementation of the various networks of ideas or policies 
transform this sectoral Europeanisation in a week flux of change. Therefore, 
I suggested the role of these European federations of parties as deliverers of 
various quality labels without activating a real realignment of their political 
identification (Soare 2002). 
Indeed, Romanian parties were rapidly caught in a rhetorical trap, which 
forced them to accept without debate the parameters of the transition: 
enlargement, economic reform, ethnic and religious tolerance, etc. 
Consequently, in order to acquire a democratic reputation, parties neglected 
underlying national cleavages. Therefore, the link between the Romanian 
parties and democracy was not built on national support but on European 
labels of quality. A clear European commitment and an acceptance of 
integration into a party federation was equivalent to: 
Proof of coherent ideological program = a status of national and 
international collaboration = systemic/democratic label of quality. 
The opposite correlation can also be identified: 
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Euro-scepticism or refusal to join a European party federation = lack of a 
coherent ideological program = national and international  ostracism = 
absence of a democratic label of quality. 
By transcending the structural conflicts, the resulting consensus is only an 
elite level collusion, an open road the alienation of the population and the 
rise of populist movements. 
In this sense, as in the old Member States, “Europe becomes a matter for the 
governing politicians and their bureaucracies; it is not something that 
requires the active engagement of, or the consultation with, the electorate at 
large” (Mair 2001: 48). Europeanisation has a hierarchical effect 
contributing  to the creation of limited spheres of  European labelled 
frameworks whose effectiveness is not matched by a deep relationship with 
the whole society.  
Consequently, following Mair’s criteria, the EU would have had an 
important impact on the Romanian party system by affecting the mechanism 
of the system, “the way in which parties interact with one another in the 
national electoral arena by modifying the ideological distance separating the 
relevant parties” (2001). This remark suggests also the absence of an 
influence on the format of the party system, the establishment or the 
substitution of old parties by new ones. Thus, I suggest not an indirect but 
an incomplete effect of Europeanisation throughout the political party 
system in Romania. The EU-based transnational federation of parties has 
acted as a socialization agency, the national parties using their labels more 
to gain international respectability and less to manage deep identity 
engineering. 
It is then important to portray the direction of acting of the Europeanisation 
process. Following this perspective, Cowles, Caporaso and Risse (2001) 
suggest analysing “the degree of fit” between the prescriptions of the EU 
and the existing arrangements of the Member States. The adaptation 
pressure is then described as the main cause of change. Between misfit and 
adaptation, the direction of change is thus clearly delimitated. Still, as 
Szostak (2004) observes it, the authors fail in the differentiation of the 
European fields, presenting EU as a “blanket homogenizing force”. Knill 
and Lemkulh (2002) introduce a more flexible framework by establishing 
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different explanatory approaches. This suggests that the adaptation pressure, 
opportunity structures and beliefs are essential for the understanding of the 
directions chosen by the Europeanisation issue. 
 
2.3. Direction and scope of the changes  
A supplementary framework for better understanding this process is to 
portray the analysis of these dynamics and values in conformity with the 
impact of these effects. In a well-known article on the impact of Europe on 
national party systems, Mair underlines their limited influence within the 
national political arena considering that party systems “have perhaps proved 
to be most impervious to change” (2001: 28). The Irish scholar portrays a 
real capacity of the national party systems to resist the impact of 
Europeanisation and this conclusion helps us to better understand the 
Romanian party situation. 
 
In order to substantiate these theoretical observations, it is necessary to turn 
to a more empirical approach. In this respect, this methodological approach 
reflects a broader discussion about the relevance of what is called an in vitro 
analysis of the party actors. In other terms, it is often emphasized that the 
understanding of a political system, and in this case a party system, reflects 
the political structures’ reciprocal dependency on a general national 
environment. Before this, emphasise is laid on a brief overview of the 
institutional evolution of the links between Bucharest and Brussels. 
 
 
3. Brief institutional overview 
After the dismantlement of the iron curtain, the legitimacy of the European 
Communities was strengthened as the unique depository of an economic, 
commercial and politic European project. This is the starting point of a 
regional rediscover of Europe, supported by various financial programmes 
and the progressive establishment of structural relationship with Brussels. 
Still, while the history-making year of 1989 confirmed a potential enlarged 
EC, previous relationships, mainly economic, can be mentioned, identifying 
back at the end of the sixties the beginning of a tortuous political and 
economic relation between the authorities from Bucharest and the European   37
institutions. In 1974, Romania is the first communist state integrating a 
network of economic collaboration with EC. Several other agreements 
delimit the economic and commercial exchanges between the two. But, 
abruptly, at the end of the 80s, the commercial negotiations are stopped and, 
in June 1989, Romania is openly criticised for the rigid internal political 
management. The late December 1989 events are catalysts for the recent 
connections with Brussels. 
 
In political terms, in 1993, the democratic Romania signs the first 
agreements with Brussels and in 1995, in Snagov, a report commonly signed 
by all the parliamentary parties
1 launches the national strategy for pre-
accession. Four years later, in Helsinki, the Commission recommend to 
initiate the negotiations with Romania. Starting with the 15 February 2000 
until the end of 2004, the political elite has to manage the difficult 31 
chapters of negotiation. An important delay would be soon registered while 
Bulgaria succeeded in closing long time before Romania the chapters and 
the European authorities criticised regularly the Romanian team slowness. 
Still, the last EU Commission report from October 2004 recommended 
Romania for the 2007 integration process. 
 
In this framework, it is necessary to go beyond the general impressions of 
success. Despite the last positive p oints in terms of October 2004 EU 
Commission recommendation or the December 2004 announcement of the 
31 chapters’ closure, the Romanian integration process cannot be presented 
as a unitary framework. There are regular regressions and if all the ways go 
to Brussels, the Romanian path is definitely a tortuous one. 
 
3.1. Democratic conditionality 
In order to analyse in depth this tortuous relationship, one has to pay 
attention to an important variable that define the rhythm of the pre-accession 
process. While during the 80s, Europe is perceived as a cultural link with the 
                                                                        
1 Following the model of the Spanish Moncloa Pact, this meeting symbolises the 
acceptance of the EU integration process by all the parliamentary parties. Similarly, 
the agreement reached in October 1 977 between the Spanish Government and 
delegates of the most representative political parties sets the basis for a commonly 
accepted political transformation. 
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Western societies, at the beginning of the 90s a technical procedure asserts 
itself as the only interpretation of Europe. The famous Kundera vision 
synthesised by his article “Occident kidnappé”(1983) is replaced by rigid 
political and economic agreements
2. Still, within this complex structure with 
technical sectoral subunits that characterise the final outcome of the 
integration, one can find a fundamental link with the 80s: the emphasis on 
the democratic values. 
 
The transition literature identifies democratic conditionality and various 
politic, economic, cultural, etc. incentives as replacing the classic instrument 
of control in the promotion of the democracy. Moreover, conditionality 
implies that foreign institutions can require from a sovereign state that it 
consolidates democracy before benefiting from a promised advantage, in 
this case the EU integration. This requirement supposes that state can be 
sanctioned or even deprived of the promised advantage if it does not comply 
with the previous agreement. In this regard, “it is the EU that has come to be 
most associated with practicing democratic conditionality while the prize for 
compliance is no less than eventual membership for new democracies” 
(Pridham 1999: 1222). 
 
Significantly for this paper, Romania's democratic status has been put 
several times into question by the European institutions since December 
1989. First of all, Brussels has criticized the 1990 events of Târgu Mures 
(the violent clashes between the Hungarian minority and the Romanian 
majority from Transylvania) and the violent repression of the anticommunist 
meeting from Piata Universitatii (June 1990). Over the last decade, several 
other similar criticisms are mentioned, mainly linked to the miners’ violent 
actions (1991 or 1999), the minorities rights, the press transparency, etc. Not 
later that March 2004, Romania’s democratic status is questioned once 
again. Still, in terms of official reports on Romania,  since 1997, the 
                                                                        
2 As asserted by Agh (2004: 11), “the alienation of the populations from the EU 
integration processes has created an “accession democratic deficit”, since they have 
excluded the social and territorial ( n.a.  cultural, religious actors too) from the 
negotiation process, unlike in the Nordic countries where they had organically been 
included in the negotiation team (…). It is a commonsense that the country as a 
whole enters the EU and not just the governments that have almost monopolized the 
EU relationship until now”.   39
Commission reports have regularly underlined a relatively regular political 
status in conformity with Copenhagen criteria. 
 
In this general framework, it is relevant to integrate in our analysis the case 
of Slovakia. At the beginning of 1998, Commission critics of the Meciar 
government were an important incentive for the management of the 
Džurinda government to catch up with the other prospective Member States. 
These observations have to be integrated in a chronologically larger 
perspective, since from the early 90s the democratic conditionality has 
designed the relationships between Slovakia and the EU institutions. Meciar 
populist and racist politics were at the centre of these criticisms. Yet more 
relevant for the analysis, is the  Slovakian success story, linked to the 
strength of European pressure for the civil society and, most of all, for the 
post-Meciar government. There are thus indications that political parties do 
matter in the strategic use of support for or against integration and 
Džurinda’s government clearly made the difference over the preceding 
administration. However, the Slovakian case differs in a very important way 
from the Romanian case  - throughout all Romanian governments EU 
agreement was seen as being essential for the legitimization of the 
party/parties in government. Significantly, any European boycott/critic was 
instrumentally used in order to emphasize the lack of commitment to 
democracy and a potential loss of the legitimacy to govern. Still, rather than 
an appropriateness of the EU programs, this reaction only shows that the 
Romanian party landscape is less transparent than it seems at a first glance. 
In conformity with the hypothesis of this article, the Romanian case 
illustrates that the commitment of national governments to EU democratic 
conditionality is not a synonym for long-term  Europeanisation  . On the 
contrary, the risk of international isolation and the loss of the democratic 
label are the main incentives for what I called an ex ante consensus. 
 
4. Rediscovering Europe in Romania 
The analysis of the aftermath of the communist regimes points at the 
difficult birth of parties and party systems over the region. Different 
obstacles can be mentioned ranging from a very fluid political, economic 
and social landscape to a more general historical framework. Plus, if at the 
beginning parties were supposed to be catalysts for stable and rapid 
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democratisation in the region, democratic enthusiasm was soon replaced by 
scepticism and disillusionment. Therefore, just like in  the West, parties 
rapidly became the new democracies’ mal-aimés (Seiler 2000). One possible 
explanation of this changing situation entails incapacity of building stable 
and coherent political identities. And exactly in this area the lack of debate 
about Europe becomes a fundamental explanatory factor for drifting 
potentialities. 
 
4.1. Pattern of political management: historical roots of compulsory  
consensus 
It is customary to start an analysis with a description of the most relevant 
theoretical concepts. And, from this point of view, the conceptual map of 
Rokkan and Lipset is an essential path for understanding the inner world of 
a political party system. Viewed from this perspective, the modern political 
world is part of a comprehensive map gravitating around four cleavages: 
centre vs. periphery, State vs. Church, primary economic sector vs. 
secondary economic sector, and workers vs. employers (1967: 14). 
Following this multilevel scheme, Seiler synthesizes the Rokkanian 
historical perspective in a morphological explanation of the positive role of 
cleavages in the construction of a democracy. He portrays the cleavages as a 
source of stability in a political system guaranteeing political representation 
of social conflicts. In other words, it can be described as a type of evolution: 
contradictions ﬁ fights ﬁ conflicts ﬁ cleavages ﬁ consensus (2002: 117). 
 
In order to assess the landscape concerning the Europe rediscover in 
Romania, the present investigation has to deal with a broader historical 
perspective. Similarly to the European consensus after 1989, the 
modernization issue was prevalent before the WW II as the main linkage 
between parties. However, there is no superposition between the two issues. 
The similarity concerns the mechanism of national political  management 
under the pressure of an external incentive and not the content of the 
reforms. Between East and West, important historical differences have led 
to alternative paths of political development. The 19th century emergence of 
modern political administrations is the key issue of this argument. During 
this period, a concentrated historical evolution has resulted in a compulsory 
juxtaposition of national and industrial revolutions in practically all   41
countries on the Eastern periphery. In this context, t his juxtaposition 
provides the general framework for a multilevel “catching up” with temps 
perdu. The approval or the rejection of the models of modernization evolved 
into party differentiations, the Modernists vs. Conservatives (Márkus 1994). 
 
In the Romanian case, the fight for independence portrays another 
juxtaposition that engendered a real political automatism. For the 
conservatives or modernists, all party discussions centred on the national 
legitimacy issue, leaving the political organizations of the various 
minorities, mainly the Hungarian minority out in the cold. Consequently, all 
other tensions or social conflicts were underrepresented or even denied in 
order to better emphasize the national Romanian consensus. The 
overemphasized national label p rovided the main party identity and 
legitimised a cartelization of the Romanian ethnically based parties. All 
divergent messages from either the minorities’ political organizations or the 
Romanian Communist Party (PCR) were forgotten. It is thus impossible to 
identify a classical conceptual map of cleavages. Moreover, I intend to 
consider the Romanian party system as an  ex ante consensus, where the 
political conflict routinization is required before any institutional democratic 
competition. In fact, parties refuse to present themselves as representations 
of sectoral social conflicts in order to achieve a general political consensus 
throughout the elections. On the contrary, their primary organizing principle 
is not a limited social base but the whole nation. 
 
Romanian modern party arena constitutes a distinct model of social conflict 
management by avoiding direct social representation. The consensus 
necessary for any democratic administration is emphasized prior to any 
political contest, illustrating a strong, even if socially superficial 
cartelization of the Romanian ethnic parties. Romanian modernization is 
presented as a consensual process articulated around the nation’s common 
well-being. 
 
What are the consequences of this specific pattern of political organization? 
After all, the Romanian procommunist regime is a limited democracy, but 
still a democracy. The  effet pervers  of this democratic deficit of the 
Romanian political parties before World War II refers directly to the 
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utilization by the communist regime of a political collective global vision, 
facilitating the implementation of an alternative myth to the national 
consensus: the myth of the collective destiny (Barbu 1998: 38). The 
protection of the nation as the main political identity before 1947 opened the 
road for alternative assessments: a consensus for the people, for the working 
class, for the socialist society, etc (Ibid.). 
 
For reasons spelt out above, it makes sense to look at the Romanian 
communist regime only as a partial breakdown with the c onstitutional 
monarchy. The consensus structured by the unique party, the PCR, is 
supposed to transcend any particular identities. The content may change, but 
the logic is similar to the previous political situation, although the 
communist regime accomplished a severe transformation of the society. 
Following the same process presented above, this artificial solidarity 
indirectly undermined the whole edifice of communist institutions. Social 
conflicts without any form of representation accelerated the rifts leading to 
the emergence of an alternative message. This framework could explain the 
creation of parallel societies, with divergent interests, and the rising of 
numerous individual protests. And, in this sense, the global political 
situation focused on a compulsory national consensus brought about, in a 
more or less straightforward manner, the events of December 1989. 
 
Through the perspective of continuity, characterized by the absence of 
transparent cleavages and by a compulsory  ex ante consensus, recent 
Romanian history follows this same path. It is thus not difficult to find 
explanations why the post-communist Romanian party landscape continues 
this compulsory consensual discourse. The synchronization between ethnos 
and demos is one of the main guidelines of the Romanian party system. This 
is the level where the EU intervened indirectly, and superficially, in the 
configuration of the Romanian party system. The founding dyad of the 
Romanian party system (anticommunist vs. ex-communist) provides several 
automatically attached labels to each side of the substitute of cleavage 
indicated above. Seiler’s economic distinction between maximalists and 
minimalists is automatically linked to this logic, the historical parties being 
all associated with an attachment to a profound and rapid economic reform 
while the opposite pole assimilated with a refractory response to economic   43
reform. Similarly, in the context of the violent events at the beginning of the 
1990s, the FSN and its allies were associated with a non-systemic or a 
limited democratic attachment, while the historical parties and their main 
ally, the political organization of the Hungarian minority  - RMDSZ, 
received a democratic label of quality. The international boycott of the FSN 
after the violent management of the Tirgu Mures or Piata Universitatii 
events portrays the impact of external constraints in building the Romanian 
party system. In other words, on the basis of this initial FSN ostracism, the 
subsequent collaboration with the EU party federations was seen as natural 
for the historical parties and very problematic for the PDSR, the main heir 
of the initial FSN. In this context, the correlation presented above underlines 
the relevance of a label of quality delivered from peripheral areas of the EU 
institutions. 
 
The collaboration between the European party federations and the local 
national parties was a long process
3. In the Romanian case, only in the mid-
1990s could the main party players use nationally their European labels of 
quality. The coincidence with the 1996 change in power is thus symbolic. 
To put it most starkly, the acceleration of the Romanian European 
integration process started in the same period. Precisely why and how this 
acceleration was managed is a very large topic. In short, for the conjectural 
reason of the 1996 change in power, the CDR-USD-RMDSZ governmental 
                                                                        
3 At the 20th Socialist International (SI) Congress from New York (1996), the 
Democrat Party (PD) and the historical social democrats (PSDR) receive the status 
of consultative members. Three years later, in Paris, they become full members of 
the SI. During San-Domingo SI (2001) meeting, the heir of the FSN (the Social 
Democrat Party  – PSD) becomes consultative member and, two years later, full 
member of the SI. Parallel to it, on 4 March 1998, the European Socialists accepted 
PD and PSDR as observers and, during the 2001 PES Congress in Berlin the PSD 
received a similar status. In April 1999, the liberals (PNL) became full members of 
the ELDR. In 1987, the well-known leader of the Romanian Farmers’ Party 
(PNTCD) asked Jean-Marie Daillet for membership in the European Union of the 
Christian Democrats and on 6 December 1996, the EPP Political Bureau delivered 
the PNTCD the status of observer. Three years later, after having flirted with the 
ELDR, the Hungarian Minority Alliance (RMDSZ) received also the EPP status of 
observer. 
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coalition enjoyed the use of all the consequences of their European party 
attachment - proof of coherent ideological program, a status of national and 
international collaboration and a systemic/democratic label of quality. This 
triple capital of quality was also used in order to begin the EU integration 
process, relatively frozen since the beginning of the 1990s.  
 
The recent collaboration of the PSD with the European Socialists seemed to 
confirm a generalized label of quality delivered by the EU party federations 
to all main party players, with one main exception – PRM. But, according to 
the data from above, although the individual parties had received labels of 
quality due to their Europeanisation, this had a limited impact on the 
Romanian national party system. The party competition per se did not suffer 
real transformation. The number of the relevant parties in contention in the 
national political arena remained unchanged. The P RM, as an anti-
establishment party, despite its European ostracism, has “other powerful 
strings to its bows” as Mair observes it for other similar organizations 
(2001: 33). The PRM acts precisely in the area ignored by all the 
Europeanised  labelled parties. The Romanian  ex ante  general  consensus 
ignores, as in the past, the social lines of conflicts, by focusing on an 
overvaluation of the national/common good of the society. After all, the 
same historical pattern provides an explanation about the current situation. It 
is worth noting that in order to receive a democratic label of quality all the 
party players had to embrace the automatically associated labels of a 
maximalist economic position, a pro-European position, etc. There was no 
disconnection between the main democratic label and the complementary 
automatic labels of quality summarized by the founding dyad of the 
Romanian political arena. And again a veil was thrown over the real social 
conflicts and this time the winner could be PRM. Therefore, I consider the 
2000 presidential and parliamentarian elections not as an accident but a 
preview of the potential risks of an unstable democracy. Similarly, the 2004 
legislative and presidential criticisms of corruption cast important doubts 
about the stability of the Romanian democracy. 
 
As such, the Romanian absolute consensus about the EU promotes a 
cartelization among those parties with governing aspirations based on a 
label of democratic quality and an inevitable reduction of any alternative   45
debate on EU. In fact, the linkages between the national parties and the EU 
federations of parties became more and more extensive, with a major 
exception, the PRM. By using exclusively an exterior pattern of 
Europeanisation, the Romanian parties act as structures possessing, in 
conformity with their specific party European networks, the labels of 
democratic quality that I already described. Nevertheless, the international 
consensus about their status of political collaboration (the legitimacy of an 
alliance) is not reflected in the Romanian political arena that is still affected 
by a strong polarization. What is noteworthy in the present context is that by 
taking Europe out of the national item of competition, the main excluded 
party cannot access a label of quality. For reasons spelt out above, the PRM 
is only partially excluded from the competition. Indirectly, in terms of the 
label of quality, this specific Europeanisation cannot impeach the 
establishment of the PRM as a relevant alternative to the systemic part. 
From this point of view, Europe might have influenced the mechanics of the 
Romanian party system indirectly by encouraging the use of the artificial 
logic of the labels of quality and also the implementation of a general ex 
ante consensus, meaning a non-coherent translation of the socio-economic 
features and facts. 
 
Therefore, not only does the EU demand political reforms, but the 
Romanian parties continue to exploit their previous labels of quality without 
trying to target a real reform of the political system. In  this area, the 
incomplete and indirect effects of an external Europeanisation are direct 
source of confusion and indirect source of instability.  
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CDR (Conventia Democrata din România): Romanian Democratic Convention 
EC: European Community 
ELDR: European Liberal Democrats 
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FSN (Frontul Salvarii Nationale): National Salvation Front 
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
NATO: North Atlantic Organisation 
PCR (Partidul Comunist Român): Romanian Communist Party 
PD (Partidul Democrat): Democratic Party 
PDSR (Partidul Democratiei Sociale din România): Party of the Romanian Social-
Democracy 
PES: Party of the European Socialists 
PNL (Parti National Liberal): National Liberal Party 
PNTCD (Partidul National Taranesc Crestin Democrat): Agrarian Christian 
Democrat National Party 
PRM (Partidul România Mare):  Great Romania Party 
PSD (Partidul Social Democrat): Social Democratic Party 
PSD (Polul Social Democrat): Social Democratic Pole 
PSDR (Partidul Social Democrat Român): Romanian Social-Democratic Party 
RMDSZ (Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség): Democratic Alliance of 
Hungarians in Romania  
SI: Socialist International 
USD (Uniunea Social-Democrata): Social-Democrat Union   47
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Analysis of European Security Culture in Historical Terms 
 
Cigdem Ustun 
 
Introduction 
The European Union’s development began with a succession of economic 
agreements and treaties after WW2, in the belief that as the countries 
cooperated on economic issues, then their cooperation would spread to other 
spheres of the relations between the countries. The hope was that the spill – 
over effect would bring peace to the continent after two awfully devastating 
wars. The main idea behind the ECSC, European Atomic Energy 
Community and the European Economic Community (EEC) was to set the 
stage so as to make it impossible for the European countries to enter into 
further wars. Thus, European Integration encompassed the idea of security 
in the continent from the very beginning. People have always been in search 
of a peaceful way to live. It is a very crucial issue today too. I am not going 
to say that this is more true than ever before, because throughout history, 
there have been wars, and other bloody conflicts. The security of the people, 
states and nations has always been important and is important today. 
However, this issue is topical today because:  
The last enlargement brought together two halves of a continent 
that had been artificially divided for almost five decades. Now, 
The Union has 25 members, a population of 450 million and the 
EU has a quarter of the world’s GNP.(MEMO/03/192).  
Thus, after the enlargement, new security threats and new expectations 
have emerged. In one of the EU MEMOS it is said that:  
In order to maintain a secure Europe in the midst of these 
changes, it has become imperative to develop a new security 
“culture”(understanding) in Europe. 
However, it should be remembered that the EU’s security culture would 
not be a brand new  culture. This security culture will be based on the 
culture that the EU has had for many years. Because of this, one of the 
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aims of this paper is to show the salient features of this historical 
background.    
Also this paper is a part of the ongoing research about the comparison of the 
EU security culture and Turkish security culture. This issue is especially 
important since the commission advised on the start of the negotiations. 
Today, one of the arguments is that the EU needs the energy resources in the 
Middle East, and Central Asia, thus the Turkish Accession is crucial. Yet, 
this kind of thinking would be very naïve. This is not an easy process. As 
mentioned in the “Recommendation of the European Commission on 
Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession” by the Commission: 
…. The Union and Turkey has differences in the foreign policy 
issues when it comes to Turkey’s neighbours. 
 
Thus, it is important to analyse the security cultures and developments of 
these cultures of the two actors to analyse the accession process. This paper, 
however, does not go into details of this comparison. Hopefully, the 
research, when it is over, will be able to make this comparison in detail. This 
paper is about the security culture in Europe based on the historical 
development of European Integration, which will be used afterwards in the 
research to compare and contrast the historical experiences of the two actors 
in terms of the security culture and tradition.  
The European Defence Community and European Political 
Community’s Effect on the Security Culture of the Union 
Common Foreign and Security Policy is not a new policy in the Union and 
St Malo would not be the starting point for the identity of security. From 
1950s up to the present day security has been a significant part of the 
discussions among member countries whether they are 6, 12, 15 or 25.  
The story begins with the Pleven Plan. Rene Pleven, was a French politician, 
who held a succession of Cabinet posts after WWII was twice PM for short 
periods. In 1950, he sponsored the unsuccessful Pleven Plan for a unified 
European Army, which laid the groundwork for NATO. This French Plan 
was suggested after the outbreak of the Korean War. The American and 
European powers were insisting on the rearmament of Germany. However, 
French authorities were not really pleased with this idea. This Plan was 
thought to prevent German troops being under German command and end  
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the Allied occupation of West Germany. This was an attempt to have an 
integrated European Army under joint command. As taken from the Pleven 
Plan:  
 
The setting up of a European Army cannot result from a mere 
grouping together of national military units… For tasks, which 
are inevitably common ones, common institutions will do … 
under a single European political and military authority. 
1 
 
The European Defence Community (EDC) entailed the appointment of a 
Minister of Defence, who would have the same duties and responsibilities as 
the national defence ministers have. He would serve as the normal channel 
between the European Community and outside countries or international 
organs for everything relating to the carrying out of his task.
2 Furthermore, 
this plan foresaw the common budget for the European Army and the 
creation of a Political Community (EPC) with an elected parliament, a 
European Executive Council, a Council of Ministers and a Court of Justice.  
Parallel to the European Defence Community, as the Pleven Plan suggested, 
a European Political Community with a two chamber parliamentary 
assembly, a European Executive Council, a council of ministers and a court 
of Justice was suggested. Ultimately these two suggestions were not 
accepted. The French Assembly did not ratify the EDC Treaty and EPC 
which was in the treaty, (Art 38.) was not ratified either.  
 
Although the French Assembly rejected both EDC and EPC in 1954, they 
remain significant steps in the history of the integration process and are 
crucial for an advanced understanding of the security culture in European 
integration.  First of all, the idea of cooperation is evident in these attempts. 
Although France resisted the idea of the armament of Germany, they tried to 
integrate, and cooperate to protect their national priorities, under the motto 
“Cooperation under all circumstances.  
Secondly, the failure of EDC and EPC demonstrates the vital importance of 
national sovereignty in the integration process. It shows that there is a 
delicate balance between an efficient common foreign policy and at the 
                                                                        
1 As quoted in http://www.eu-history.leidenuniv.nl/index.php3?c=51 (15.10.04).  
2 Fursdon (1980).  
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same time maintaining respect for national sovereignty. (Risso, 2004) While 
the protection of  national sovereignty  was a crucial element of the 
governments’ European policy,  they understood that  it  was important to 
achieve the harmonisation of their foreign policies.  
The CFSP established by the EU so as to have a say in world affairs reflects 
the EU’s stance over this policy. As a result of these two dimensions, 
economic relations with the third countries came into the agenda. Since, the 
economic integration had been, not easier, but faster and efficient among the 
member states, the economic aid, and sanctions have become an important 
tool for the European Member States.  
The EDC and EPC failed because the members were not ready to pool their 
sovereignties into the foreign and security policy, especially in the armed 
forces. Still today, the members are not enthusiastic about pooling their 
sovereignties in these two areas, as Hughes argues. These attempts were 
very sudden and rapid, so they were not accepted by the members. The 
European way of doing things has always been step by step, be it small 
steps. The Monnet method has been a steady and slow one. This is also 
evident in the theories of the European Integration process.  
 
European Integration has been a functionalist one. Mitrany, (1943) 
suggested that of a number of units having different responsibilities working 
together. Each small unit involved in a small peace of national sovereignty 
that takes these responsibilities to an international level. As they function, 
further integration will take place. As he says in his work, this network will 
become so extensive, and people will identify themselves with these new 
functioning units and so no nation will be able to break the peace. As these 
units function, the integration will be an automatic one, there is no need for 
construction. This functionalist approach is crucial in understanding the 
security culture of the Union. The Member States prefer to develop the 
policies, step-by-step, small steps in every aspect of their policies. There is a 
deep belief that a functioning extensive system will appear eventually, and 
automatically. They applied this to the economic integration and it is applied 
to the CFSP as well.  The Member states would not and did not accept any 
dramatic transfer of sovereignty.  This was the failing point of the EPC and 
EDC in 1950s and 1960s.  
  
 
  53 
 
Developments from the 1970s to the present day and their effects on 
the security culture in the Union 
 
When we look at the 1970s, on the basis of the Davignon Report the 
European Political Cooperation was established. This was a small step as 
had been foreseen by the functionalist approach. The only change for the 
member states was to inform the other members of the community when 
they were engaging in an international policy which would effect the others 
too. This attempt was respectful of the national sovereignties; cooperation in 
the international sphere was kept very intergovernmental, so as not to 
disturb any of the members. This was the main understanding in the Single 
European Act (1986) too. The basis for cooperation, meaning the 
intergovernmentalism, was not changed.  
The collapse of the USSR and communism had an important effect in the 
security culture of the Union.  As Flechtner says:  
 
The territorial threat from the Eastern Bloc had vanished and 
with the eastern enlargement of the Union, there was an 
opportunity for the peaceful unification of the continent. 
(Flechtner, 2004).  
 
The absence of a threat at the doorstep, helped the Union to give more 
importance to human rights, political cooperation, promotion of democracy 
and the rule of law.  
In 1991, the Maastricht Treaty brought some changes in the CFSP but, they 
did not include the changes in the intergovernmental structure of the system 
at all. After Maastricht, in every IGC and the treaty there have been changes 
brought to the Policy area, new tasks, and  headlines goals came into the 
agenda. Even, a High Representative for the CFSP was established and 
given some responsibilities, yet, the idea of national sovereignty was kept. It 
is argued that the consensus, and t he unanimity vote are causing the 
problems in the Policy. It is a fact that the member states first think 
nationally, and then, European. The European Union always experienced 
hard times when there was a conflict in Kosovo, the Gulf Crisis, and the Iraq 
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War. It is a very hard task to transcend the national interests of the 
individual states. For example in the Kosovo War, the states could not come 
up with a definitive strategy and instruments to stop the bloodshed at the 
centre of the continent. There were various reasons for this, like:  
 
National sensitivities towards the use of force, diverging 
historical reflexes, the impact of public opinion and vulnerability 
of governments to their particular constraints.”
3  
 
Similar restraints prevented the EU Member states from acting together in 
the War in Iraq. The use of military force and the special relationships 
among the states caused problems. The relations between the UK and USA 
and the CEECs and the USA affected the course of events. Furthermore, the 
understanding of the use of force had a huge effect in the debate, i.e. France 
and UK maintaining that force must be used to defend interests, and 
Sweden, Austria and Finland argued the force must be restrained as much as 
possible. (Ryning, 2003:483)  The European Security Policy depends on the 
25 Member states attitude. These states should agree on the common pursuit 
of strategic interests. This requires a common threat perception among the 
25 member countries, the political will among these members, and civilian 
and military tools to act. Although the deficiencies of the policy are not the 
subject of the paper, this characteristic is important in understanding the 
culture of the EU. Yes, it is a fact that the states give priority to the national 
foreign policies and national security, and states have their own agendas, 
but on the other hand, the dialogue and cooperation to a certain extent 
continues. This is crucial since it is very hard to continue with the dialogue, 
when a number of states cannot find a common ground in cases like Iraq. 
Since the EU could not afford to build up a new security culture, a 
multilateral international cooperation has become part of the EU security 
culture today.  
 
In 1947, article II of the Italian constitution, clearly stated the relation 
between national sovereignty and international cooperation;  
 
Italy consents, on condition of parity with other states, to 
limitations of sovereignty necessary to an order for assuring 
                                                                        
3 As quoted in www.iss-eu.org/newslttr/n31e.html (11.10.04)  
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peace and justice among nations; it promotes and favours 
international organisations directed towards that end.
4 
 
The EU owes the continuation of the cooperation and dialogue among the 
members, to the vagueness of the declarations. For instance, in Solana’s 
European Security Strategy, Europe’s strategic objectives have been listed after 
the disputes over the war in Iraq. One of these objectives is “Building Security in 
the EU’s Neighbourhood”. It is stated in “A Secure Europe in a Better World” 
that: 
 
We need to extend the benefits of economic and political 
cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political 
problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active 
interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in 
due course also be a neighbouring region. 
The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious 
problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved 
conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued 
engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective 
economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of 
the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab 
World should also be considered. 
 
This statement is a very positive one. However, it does not answer the 
questions like How?, When?, or who will do these?. This is a common way 
of declaring statements in Europe. When one looks at the declarations of the 
Union, one would have a hard time to answer the questions above.  
 
Another important issue in the same document is the subject of “An 
International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism”. Here Solana 
stressed the significance of the rule based international order. This is a very 
classical declaration indeed. But it is as crucial as its typicality.  It is more 
important today because we are living in a world, where the bigger countries 
have their own rules for engagement in wars. However, the Union, tirelessly 
                                                                        
4 Similar provisions were inserted in many other Western European constitutions, as 
is the case of the French Fourth Republic and West Germany’s Basic Law.  
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talks about the significance of multilateralism. Today, it is very sad that the 
multilateral organisations, and international cooperations are losing their 
significance since two of the most powerful countries declared their own 
doctrines. After the September 11 attacks, the common belief was that the 
international cooperation was at its peak. The Europeans, Russians and 
Americans with the help of all the other countries in the world would fight 
against organized crime, terrorism, drugs and all global challenges. 
However, today, it is very much evident that America is on her own, as the 
Russians are, after the Beslan attacks. But, the EU and also the member 
countries seem to be still very much attached to the idea of international 
cooperation and multilateralism. One of the best examples for this would be 
the financial support and trade facilitation with the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
This is very much related to another characteristic of the EU foreign and 
security policy. The threats laid down in the Solana Document, are not 
purely military threats. The policy was never military based and it cannot 
ever be only military. Always, the Union had a broad set of policy tools and 
hard power
5 would be the last resort in the EU. The example of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran is important in this sense too. As we all know today, there 
are serious allegations against Iran about nuclear weapons. Here, the EU is 
trying to negotiate non – proliferation of nuclear weapons with Iran on the 
basis of financial support and trade. Other than the EU, none of the states 
like the USA, pursued economic relations or trade facilitations with Iran. 
This is the best example that would show the importance of cooperation and 
dialogue with other countries for the EU.    
 
The EU is aware of the fact that the Member states on their own are not 
capable of affecting world affairs by themselves, but that they need the 
Union. It should be always kept in mind that the EU is not only Germany, 
France, and the UK. The smaller countries feel the necessity of the 
cooperation at the international level. This necessity shows itself in the 
political culture of the union eventually.    
As important as the other reasons, the complexity of the institutional 
systems in the EU in terms of CFSP affects the culture in the EU.  
 
                                                                        
5 I mean military power, although there are people who would assume the economic 
power as hard power. But in this paper hard power is taken as military power.
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Source: Per M. Martinsen, The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – A 
Strategic Culture in the making? p. 25  
  
As it is seen from Figure I, there a re various and different institutions 
involved in the decision making process of the ESDP. The High 
Representative, the European Council, Commission, COREPER, Political 
and Security Committee, DG for External Relations, DG for External and 
Politico  – Military Affairs and the other institutions in Figure I have 
importance in the decision making process. Some have more power than 
others, but eventually all these institutions should work together to form a 
foreign policy. Within the different range of institutions, the officers within 
these institutions are coming from different backgrounds with different 
traditions. In the EU decision – making, these differences need to meet at a 
 
Figure I 
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common point. Thus, the complexity of the institutional structures is 
strengthening the cooperation and dialogue.   
 
There is also a certain need to mention the proposals and the 
recommendations by the Institutes, think – tanks and assemblies with a view 
to forming, a European Security Culture. As Nicole Gnesotto mentioned 
earlier in one of the speeches: 
 
The European Union needs institutes that are sufficiently 
European in their  financing, staffing and working methods to be 
able to think European, involve national institutes in joint 
projects and systematically mix together national s trategic 
cultures – taking into account their relative contributions and not 
discounting any of them, and in so doing renew the Euro  – 
American strategic dialogue.
6  
 
These institutions and the Universities working on development of the EU 
are crucial in creating an understanding of Europe and European identity. 
However, it should always be remembered that these institutes are not the 
decision bodies in the decision making process of the security strategies in 
the Union. There is an intergovernmental structure in the Union in the 
decision making, and in accordance with the deficiencies, or the national 
interests of the member countries, as mentioned above, the decisions will be 
either lowest common denominator or a little better than LCD. Thus, the 
security strategies of the Union will always be based on cooperation, and the 
significance of the international organisations. The Union, is not a state, 
although, there is still ongoing discussion as to what it is. Today, there are 
25 members and in a couple of year’s time it will be 27 or 28.  
 
Since, the Union is an international union in itself, the use of military force 
by the union would not be the same as that of nation states. Although, there 
is a certain attempt that can be observed in the Union, to have a physical 
force, this force is not similar to the force that the US or Russia has. The 
idea is not and will not be to fight with the states that do not act in a certain 
way. When the Headline Goals of the Union are read, the aim to have 
                                                                        
6 As quoted in www.isss-eu.org/newslttr/n31e.html (11.10.04)  
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physical force is to be able to solve the conflicts and stop the bloodshed. 
This is an important part of the Union culture too. The Union is not willing 
to attack anyone, but to be able to stop the conflicts so that the consequences 
of those conflicts will not harm the Union. It is promised that the proposed 
Security Research Programme is not to be used for the development of any 
offensive weaponry.  As Ryning says: 
 
A European use of force will most likely resemble that of the 
doctrine of “just war”: military coercion will take place only 
when mandated by international law (jus ad bellum) and the use 
of force will be severely constrained (jus ad bello) 
(Ryning,2003:485). 
 
The Union is bound by international law and will act according to 
international law, since at the end of t he day it is an international 
organisation. The Union, is neither prepared nor willing to practice pre-
emptive strikes. The Union, feels the soft security measures, and the 
economic, political and diplomatic instruments should be used to prevent 
conflicts in the world and if these do not work then as a last resort the use of 
force may be supported. On top of this, the forces are to make sure that the 
conflict is over and democratic governments continue their work afterwards.  
The importance given to the internationality of the security culture can be 
seen  in Recommendation 724 of the WEU Assembly. In the second part of 
the recommendations under the title of Policy on training for the military, 
Art 11 states that: 
In Germany, in certain specific areas with a  strong 
internationalist ethos, some training programmes are already 
provided internationally. For example, the curriculum offered to 
army, navy, and air force staff officers by the Bundeswehr Joint 
Staff College includes a European joint exercise, a part of which 
is taught in conjunction with the national staff colleges of 
France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. The 
Netherlands and Portugal to date have supplied instructors. 
Another association has been set up, compromising other 
training schools (in the Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, 
Portugal and Swede) offering a curriculum based on existing 
training programmes. Poland has also shown interest in this area. 
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The training character as a result of instructor and student 
exchanges, also reflects this trend. Within the Bundesakadamie 
für Sicherheitspolitik (Federal Institute for Advanced Political 
and Security studies) present and future senior management staff 
drawn from political and government circles, the armed forces, 
business and other civilian walks of life concerned with security 
policy receive training through general seminars. These are also 
open to a limited number of foreign participants by invitation of 
the federal Chancellery. The Institute also hosts other seminars 
and colloquies like those on the European Security and Defence 
Policy, which are attended by EU officers.” (Document A/1816, 
2003).  
This article is crucial in the sense that it shows the potential in the EU over 
cooperation, even over a very sensitive issue such as that of armies. As seen, 
a number of countries are working together in a sense, in training the army 
officials. This is not something that one can observe in the bilateral relations 
between the countries. The countries prefer usually to have military 
exercises like Turkey and Israel do. These two countries have a number of 
military agreements and practiced military exercises together. Lots of 
security based agreements take place between the two countries. Since 
Turkey decided to modernize the military and the defence structure, she 
needed a partner to be able to provide this kind of service. It was not 
possible to get the arms and weaponry from the western allies so she 
decided to get them from Israel. Thus, there have been several agreements 
and training between the two countries. These relations included the training 
of the two armies, via operational cooperation between two countries. 
Turkey also allowed the Israelis to fly over Turkey, in other words she 
allowed them to use Turkey’s airspace. However, the cooperation between 
these two countries, in spite of the close military relations, did not include 
cooperation as the Europeans have. Especially a politico military decision-
making authority like the Franco – German Defence and Security Council 
which is not a very easy  task to achieve in other parts of the world, 
especially where Turkey is situated.  
 
Finally, as regards the cooperation among the Member States, I just want to 
mention the proposed European Security and Defence College, which is 
intended to “reflect the entire spread, civilian and military, of the European  
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Security and Defence Policy.”(Document A/1816, 2003) This college needs 
to be thought of in a different way than the NATO Defence College. NATO 
and the EU are very much different from each other, thus the training in the 
Colleges would have different aims. The EU has obviously more branches 
than NATO does, and the training of the officers in the EU for the EU, 
would definitely bring a culture aspect more evident than today’s. And I 
believe, the culture, which would be more evident, will be more focused on 
international cooperation than NATO. This culture would make more 
reference to economic, social and political aspects of the relations more than 
NATO does. Also the aims of the two organisations are very much different 
from each other. The Petersberg Tasks are humanitarian, evacuation and 
logistical support operations, peacekeeping missions crisis management. 
However, in NATO Article 5, indicates a collective defence.   
 
Another aspect of the EU, which makes its security culture more 
international, is the absence of “the other”. For the nation states i.e. USA, 
Turkey, France, Israel there are always the others, i.e. potential enemies. 
The “other” for the EU cannot be the Muslim population, Mediterranean 
population or Middle Eastern. These identities are already all in the EU 
either as citizens of the member countries or as candidates like Turkey. 
Especially after the Report on October 6, 2004, after the advise of the 
Commission on the start of the negotiations with Turkey, it is not possible to 
identify the Muslim population as “the other”. This pushes the EU to be 
more international, and cooperative in a sense. Because, it owes its existence 
to the cooperation that exists as that evident between France and Germany 
which were former enemies. 
Concluding Remarks 
All in all, although the security and foreign policies in the European Union 
became more evident in the late 90s, security has always been the main aim 
of the Union that is why today, we see a security culture based on 
cooperation and dialogue in the Union. It is a fact that the new threats and 
challenges are pushing the Union to have more military force, still the goals 
set for the military force is nothing more than the last resort in saving 
people. This force should not be thought like a nation states army or 
NATO’s military capability. Also, it is a fact that the military culture in the 
Union is a new phenomenon, with new military staff, new military officers, 
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and colleges for the education of the European soldiers that are new to the 
Union. Thus, it is possible to say the EU is in a process of developing its 
military culture but definitely, the EU has its own security culture which 
dates back to the 1950s. Besides, it is a very unique one in the world of 
Bush and Putin Doctrines. 
 
Cigdem Ustun  
University of Limerick 
Cigdem.Ustun@ul.ie  
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The Invention of the Museum of Europe 
 
Dr. Véronique Charléty 
 
 
In 2007, Europe should have its museum: it should be in Brussels. In the context 
of a growing interest for cultural heritage, this information should remain 
unnoticed. In fact, the desire to provide Europe with a museum indeed raises many 
questions and also stresses one major paradox: How can this project, conducted by 
civil society members, fit in with a construction of collective memory traditionally 
connected to the nation-state framework? 
 
It is particularly difficult to define a European identity, whereas there is already an 
inclination for writing history on a national level. This is linked with the will to 
represent European cultural heritage and histories and to use them as pedagogical 
tools to promote a collective identity, which we commonly share within the 
framework of European member-states. The destiny of museums is bound up with 
that of the nation-building process. Following the French Revolution and 
throughout the 19
th century, several European states sought to use the power of 
cultural heritage politically in order to symbolically close national territory. In this 
specific historical context, museums were used to write a common history and to 
produce a common collective memory and identity. From this point of view, the 
museum contributes to the creation of imagined communities – in the sense in 
which the phrase was coined by Benedict Anderson ( Anderson 1983). The 
development of museums is thus deeply related to the construction process of 
modern nation-states.  
 
Consequently, I would like to raise several questions, the foremost being: how to 
define a common memory for Europe through a museum. How to represent the 
history of European integration? How can a museum pass on a supranational 
principle? These points are linked with the political nature of Europe and open up 
reflection on the implementation process of this cultural project, raising questions 
such as: What could be the limits given to Europe and its history, in space and 
time, in describing a process still under construction? 
 
I would like to start to cast light on this project by examining the strategies adopted 
to shape the museum, which circumvents the traditional nation-state logic. Then I 
will examine how this project establishes a new kind of museum. And finally, I 
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would like to end this communication by presenting the issues presented for this 
project in terms of democracy and citizenship in Europe. 
 
PART I: The Museum of Europe as a Result of a Private Initiative 
The project to build the Museum of Europe in Brussels is an interesting initiative 
coming from the private sector. It is thus the result of a ‘non-decision’ (Muller and 
Surel 1998), a decision which did not come from the European institutions. This 
is, in fact, very much linked with the structural difficulty of thinking a European 
culture and imposing culture as a legitimate public policy in Europe. This project, 
and the context of its creation, conveys a great deal about the process of European 
construction itself. Culture is definitely a pointer to the limits of European 
integration and reveals the remaining national prerogatives in this field. The small 
degree of institutionalization of this sector in Europe explains why this project was 
based on different private initiatives, not necessarily linked with the Community 
framework.  
 
A European public and institutional project would have required the agreement of 
several European institutions and a significant effort of coordination among many 
ministers. It would have also required an agreement on one definition of culture 
and on one legitimate historical representation. 
 
Activist involvement and economic interests were combined in the project’s 
initiation and drew the attention of a small group of convinced intellectuals and 
politicians around a project heavily supported by the private sector. The cross 
financing of the investments in favour of this cultural project was based on three 
sources.  
(1) Private partnership: several private societies and institutions supported a non-
profit association created in 1997 to launch the project. To date, 18 private 
societies have signed a common convention for founding members
1. 
(2) The Belgian public partnership provided complementary resources to the 
project. That is to say: the federal government and the federated entities joined the 
                                                                        
1 AM Conseil, Banque européenne d’investissement, Banque Lazard, Banque 
Nationale de Belgique, BASF, Belgacom, BIAC, D’Ieteren, Ethias, Fortis, KBC, 
Lhoist, Solvay, Suez, TotalFinaElf, UCB, Union financière Boël, VUMmedia. The 
Museum is also supported by the National Lottery, the King Baudoin Foundation 
and the Paul-Henri Spaak foundation. Each founding member gives 50 000 euros per 
year during five years.  
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founding members to cover all the expenses related to the prefiguration activities 
of the Museum of Europe, such as temporary exhibitions, books and conferences. 
(3) Last but not least, the creation of the Museum of Europe was also supported by 
the European Parliament, which joined the project after the mobilization of a 
group structured around a non-profit organization. The European Parliament had, 
so to say, taken advantage of the capacity of this association to attract expertise 
and to build partnership (‘network’ of and for what?). In return, the Museum of 
Europe took advantage of a political context highly in favour of an activist 
communication and information policy led by the European Commission to attract 
tourists to the European institutions in Brussels. 
 
A tripartite meeting (Parliament, Council and Commission) in September 2002 
had given its agreement to financial support of the project. One month later, the 
Vice-President of the European Parliament, the Minister-President of Brussels-
Capital and the Mayor of Ixelles (municipality) had granted the Museum a 
building within the new Parliament under construction. The purpose was to 
promote better integration of these new buildings (devoted to the European 
Parliament) in the city. The Museum for Europe could not have found a better 
location in the heart of the European District, but does that mean in the heart of 
Europe? Such cooperation between Community institutions and the Belgian local 
political authorities is quite new. The result of these negotiations is an area of more 
than 5,000 sq m allocated to the future museum within the building devoted to the 
European Parliament but with separate access (by Montoyer Street). There will be 
a permanent exhibition completed by temporary exhibitions, a conference centre, a 
cafeteria and a shop; all very common characteristics in contemporary museums.  
 
In sum, the fact that this project was mainly implemented in a non-institutional 
way reveals many obstacles specific to the cultural field. Since 1945, the European 
cultural programmes remain a very poorly endowed sector because culture still is 
an essential part of national symbolic territory and is strongly related to a basic 
component of nation-states. And it is not a coincidence that the democratic deficit, 
often brought up to underline the limits of the European integration process, is also 
identified with a cultural deficit. The project to give Europe a Museum 
summarizes the ongoing coexistence of various representations of identity, 
legitimacy and democracy in Europe. This Museum focuses on promoting 
democracy and giving Europe a new instrument for European integration (Shore 
2000 : 13-122 ).  
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How can we evaluate this project in comparison with museums based on a 
traditional national logic? This initiative has to be placed in the governance 
perspective. The project entails a dynamic involvement of different kinds of actors 
on the political stage: the Belgian authorities, aiming to promote the city, the 
European Parliament, seeking to grant European legitimacy (and a building) to the 
project, and the private sector. That is why I have considered this project under the 
light of the governance political theory. 
 
Part II: Reshaping the Use of Museums within Europe 
In the absence of a structured European cultural policy, the project is presented as 
a result of a very risky initiative and also as an alternative to traditional patrimonial 
establishments. Benoit Remiche, General Secretary of the non-profit organization 
“Museum of Europe” has pointed out three main reasons for giving Europe a 
museum: 1) the lack of interest in the European democratic debate; 2) the political 
limits of the European project; and 3) the increasing potential of tourism in 
Brussels. 
 
At European level, the ‘demarcation process’ is becoming a necessary strategy to 
impose initiative within the public space. In this specific case, the non-institutional 
process of its implementation as well as the financial public-private partnership 
proved to be very innovative. The design of the Museum of Europe is being 
carried out mainly by a team grouping the Scientific Committee, chaired by 
Krzyzstof Pomian, a  prestigious historian who works on museums and 
historiography, and the private company Tempora, in charge of the coordination 
and the setting up of the final draft of the project in Brussels. Together, they have 
to face these challenges. And last but not least, the project has to deal with two 
principal characteristics of the European construction process, namely its new and 
unfinished aspects. 
 
That the permanent exhibition has to present a European project still under 
construction presents obvious difficulties. The main goal of this exhibition is to 
present a common European history worked out by wars and dissension. The aim 
is to reflect the diversity and complexity of European national histories. 
Traditionally, national histories were mainly shown in museums as an aggregation 
of memories presented in a very positive light (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; 
Bertrand, Cabanel and De Lafargue 2003; Thiesse 1999). By contrast, the 
museum intends to present a critical view of the European construction and this 
approach raises very interesting questions in terms of the sociological and political  
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uses of museums. How can we distance ourselves from national practices? How 
can we reinvent the museum and re-position the history of European integration in 
a long-term historical perspective, with respect to the past as well as the future? 
This is the main challenge of this project, a response to the lack of European 
legitimacy. This political and cultural project is supported by a context very much 
in favour of the European dimension of cultural heritage.  
 
In doing so, the Museum of Europe can rely on a European scientific network – 
the Museums of Europe working group, a flexible – and thus be regarded as a part 
of a museum federation working on different aspects of European civilization. The 
simultaneous emergence of the other European museums in this flexible network
2 
clearly cannot be a coincidence. In the early 21
st century, the expression and 
defence of identity have coincided with crises of great violence in many countries 
in or close to Europe. It is interesting to question the underlying meaning of this 
context. Shortly before the new millennium, three museographic projects emerged 
on the topic of Europe: one in Berlin (Museum Europäischer Kulturen, referred to 
as the MEK), another in Marseilles ( Musée des Civilisations Européennes et 
Méditerranéennes, MCEM) and the last in Brussels (Musée de l’Europe, MDE).  
 
The MEK has stated its objectives very clearly: to use its research to present 
collections which are basically ethnographic, to show common cultural aspects in 
different European countries, while highlighting their distinctive “ethnic, regional 
and national” features. The geographical position and history of the museum 
collections are suggestive of a kind of  Mitteleuropa  polarity, even though the 
scope of these collections includes all of Europe. 
 
The MCEM has adopted an anthropological perspective, taking the concept of the 
European and Mediterranean area in its broadest sense, including countries from 
Asia to the Atlantic, passing through the Mediterranean and through countries 
bordering the Mediterranean. The ambition is to start with social phenomena 
which can be identified through tangible and intangible cultural elements, both 
present and past, using them to gain an understanding of an area considered as 
coherent but which has always produced diversity. More importantly, the MCEM 
                                                                        
2 The working group was established as part of the European Council of History 
Museums by Laurent Gervereau. It is designed to provide reciprocal knowledge on 
different projects and their state of progress, to discuss  common issues and 
contribute to the emergence of joint projects. 
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aims to highlight long-term processes which transform culture, with borrowings 
from other cultures being as important as elements forgotten. 
 
The Museum of Europe, however, has focused on the history of the concept of 
Europe and moved into the construction of the European Union. Its starts with the 
basic idea that the “European Union which is taking shape in front of our very 
eyes is not a recent invention arising from a political whim, but rather the result of 
the lengthy maturing of an idea which goes back over centuries and is as old as 
Europe itself” (Colardelle 2000 : 230).
3 The Museum is the only one in the 
network with no plans for possessing its own collections. It would be difficult or 
almost impossible to assemble these collections on that basis, as the key historic 
documents are held in the national archives of each of the European countries. The 
Museum’s goal is to be the “great book of Europe”, and, in striking contrast to all 
of the other trans-European museums, it has clearly defined the scope it will cover 
(Barnavi, Goosens 2001). The argument behind its historical definition of Europe 
is based on Latin Christianity, thus excluding regions with predominantly 
Orthodox and Muslim traditions.  
 
Not equipped with a collection itself, the Museum will instead present collections 
and artefacts from the fifty European museum collections in the new federation of 
European museums, according to the topic chosen for the exhibition. This network 
also constitutes an exchange platform for collections and is open to new members 
specialized on European topics
4.  
 
The Museum of Europe has thus invented a legitimization system based on its 
multiple financing resources and on an important network of experts
5. Could 
networking (movement, circulation and exchange) be the latest way to build a 
Euroculture in constructing and implementing projects together? The actors in 
charge of this project knew how to use this trend to put Europe in a museographic 
form. This “spirit of Europe in the museums” gives the Museum of Europe a more 
dynamic role within society than is true of the traditional conception of the 
                                                                        
3 Elie Barnavi, former scientific director of the Museum of Europe. 
4 Michel Colardelle, responsible of the Marseilles project (regarding the relocation of 
the national anthropological museum from Paris to Marseilles) is also a member of 
the network. He prepared a proposal for a European agreement on museum 
collections.  
5 The participants in the network have also been required to take part in several 
symposia, especially «De l’Europe-monde à l’Europe dans le monde» on the role of 
contemporary Europe, its values and its divisions (Pomian and Dupuis 2004).   
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museum, based on an exhibition of static artefacts. We will now have to consider 
the nature of the project in this perspective. 
 
Part III: A Political Project to Promote Cultural and Democratic 
Citizenship 
 
The museographic project tends to establish common roots through history, myths 
and beliefs with the perspective of seeing what in this case would be a European 
culture emerging from this symbolic complex (Smith 1995). The first and 
principal objective is educational: to promote citizenship through the medium of 
the museum. This objective has been frequently underlined in documents 
produced by the team in charge of the Museum of Europe
6. According to this 
team, the purpose of the Museum of Europe is to show how the European Union 
has been established on a common foundation, on a specific civilization and a 
historical heritage, and that these factors cannot be taken for granted. 
Consequently, the Museum of Europe is conceived as an “Interpretation Centre 
for European History”
7, an Interpretation Centre intended to teach the 
Europeanisation process to the p ublic at large but especially to the younger 
generations. The Museum of Europe will become a place where history, memory 
and the past are interpreted and presented and this should give meaning to a 
common European identity.  
 
The Scientific Committee had difficulties in setting up limits in time and space in 
order to offer a complex and critical representation of history, and thus of a 
European identity. The time limit chosen begins around 1000 AD. The spatial 
limit was chosen to coincide with the emergence of Latin Christendom. The 
engagement of the Scientific Committee is very clear here. As Krzysztof Pomian 
put it, “Politicians may have their reasons when they choose to describe a wider 
European Union going as far as the Pacific and Central Asia. Historians have to 
point out how things happened so that decisions can not be taken without ignoring 
facts”
 8. From this point of view, the exhibition was conceived in considering only 
facts which could illustrate the emergence, the maturation and the disintegration 
                                                                        
6 Documents produced by the Museum of Europe: Musée de l’Europe. Un passé 
partagé pour un avenir commun, Curator’s International Committee, January 24. 
2004 (Document produced by the Museum of Europe Association) 
7 This label is given in France to museums without any collection. 
8 Documents produced by the Museum of Europe, op. cit. 
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processes at a supranational level: this is the main line conducting choices among 
multiple events, processes and actors for the museographic synopsis.  
 
The history of Europe is thus presented as history sui generis and the synopsis tries 
not to give a positivist or an evolutionary view on European integration. The 
permanent exhibition should encourage a critical reading of what European history 
was and is. Within this framework, the Museum of Europe contributes to the 
legitimisation for the need for history and for a common cultural heritage in 
Europe and constitutes, in itself, a strong symbolic sign.  
 
It is dedicated to presenting the different stages of the integration of the European 
continent. The almost one thousand years of European history covered are 
structured around three periods or units  – a “Unit of faith”, “Unit of 
Enlightenment” and “Unit of a project”, divided by two periods of rupture  – 
namely the religious wars, and the two world wars of the 20
th century. 
 
Preceding this historical presentation, an introduction is intended to demonstrate 
that the European Union has history, while the final part of the exhibition is to 
underline the ongoing process of integration, again as a subject not to be taken for 
granted. In the course of the exhibition, the visitor is expected to become aware of 
the tasks remaining for Europe as a whole, as well as of the historical foundations 
on which Europe, despite all conflicts, stands. Each fact should raise questions and 
make the visitor consider the integration process in a critical way. The need for a 
renewed engagement in favour of Europe should follow from this museographic 
writing process. The content of the Museum’s exhibition is to be renewed every 6 
or 7 years to keep up with the as yet unachieved political objectives of the 
European venture.  
 
The project seeks to deconstruct a history based on myths and mythical founders 
by delivering a plural interpretation of recent history, with the prospect of 
promoting the idea of a critical and engaged memory.  
 
Conclusion: A Project for Europe? 
The creation of this cultural centre results from three factors: an institutional 
strategy, the integration of the European institutions in their urban context; a 
geopolitical one, the localisation of the museum in Brussels; and, finally, an 
economic strategy based on increasing cultural tourism. The Museum of Europe  
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takes advantage of, European civil servants from new members States and tourists 
arriving in Brussels. 
 
The Museum of Europe focuses on delivering a historical and cultural base to an 
emergent European citizenship dissociated from its national roots. The patriotism 
resulting from this process is intended to enhance a common reflective and critical 
attitude towards history. One can wonder, however, how this institution will be 
able to invent something different from the historical writing of the 19
th century. 
We are curious indeed about a project whose features have much in common with 
the teaching methods of the 19
th century. It must be said that the museum in 
Brussels fully assumes this pedagogical role.  
 
In observing this project, we can see to what degree citizenship has an institutional 
component but is also a source of political and philosophical reflection, an 
arrangement between a liberal logic and a voluntarist purpose to create political 
and cultural citizenship. Citizenship remains an important source of utopia in 
Europe. This project constitutes an intellectual, political and urban challenge 
which is confronted with the limits of every museum – a recording process of 
memory, situated in time and space  – and with the ongoing evolution of its 
subject, the European integration process.  
 
All things considered, the creation of the Museum of Europe raises questions as to 
its contents and a legitimate definition of European identity: Who is part of 
Europe? Who is not and why? Who is likely to integrate one day and according to 
which principles? There is generally a stronger will to go further than a traditional 
nation-state configuration and to promote a specific idea of Europe, with the 
intention to take Brussels from its status as administrative capital to a historical 
and cultural capital. 
 
An historical museum, an identity museum: above all, the Museum of Europe is 
intended to contribute to a European citizenship. Therein lies the main challenge: 
to spread and concretize an abstract idea of a common culture and a common 
citizenship for Europe. 
 
Dr Véronique Charléty 
Groupe de Sociologie Politique Européenne,  
Institut d’études politiques 
Strasbourg 
charlety@gmx.net 
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Chronology 
 
1997  Creation of the non-profit association Museum of 
Europe; 
Oct. 2001-April 2002  Pre-figuration Exhibition: La Belle époque (Brussels); 
28 June 2002  Belgian official and public support is given to the 
project (Guy Verhofstadt and Louis Michel); 
3 July - 9 Oct. 2002  The European Parliament decides to give the Museum 
a building (D4), integrated within the new European 
Parliament under construction; 
24 Sept. 2002  Meeting between the European Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission: support is given to the project; 
20 Dec. 2002  The Belgian government gives the project financial 
support of 1 million euros (Guy Verhofstadt, Louis 
Michel and Rik Daems); 
23 Jan. 2003  Presentation of the Textbook for History in front of the 
headquarters of the German Foundation  Erinnerung, 
Verantwortung und Zukunft. This textbook is intended 
for teachers and was conceived by the Museum of 
Europe Association; 
Feb. 2003  Agreement on the architectural project with a surface 
area of 5190 sqm: 
  - Exhibition area: 3590 sqm (1990 sqm for the 
permanent exhibition; 1200 sqm for temporary 
exhibitions and 400 sqm for an area reserved for 
contemporary art exhibitions); 
    - Cafeteria: 280 sqm;  
  - Museum Shop: 220 sqm; 
  - Storage space: 280 sqm; 
15-16 Oct. 2003   State of the art presentation to Belgian and European 
institutions; 
6 Dec. 2003    Meeting of the Scientific Committee; 
24 Jan. 2004  Presentation of the Historical Project in front of the 
Curator’s International Council in Brussels; 
24 June 2004  Meeting of Founding Members. Presentation of 
Financial Plan; 
Sept. 2004  Financial Decision of the Belgian and European 
Institutions;  
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4 Dec. 2004  Presentation of the museographic project to the 
Curator’s International Committee and the Direction 
Committee; 
Sept. 2005  Drafting of another pre-figuration exhibition on “The 
Religious Experience.” 
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Italy’s and EPC Counter-Terrorist Considerations
1  
 
Ludovica Marchi 
 
 
Abstract  
This paper points out the way in which counter-terrorist considerations at the 
European level shaped Italian foreign policy from 1975 to 1992. Its 
methodological approach is provided by insights from Foreign Policy Analysis 
into the domestic sources of Italian positions on European Political Cooperation 
(EPC), but its emphasis is on empirical investigation. It employs a number of 
Italian primary sources such as the press, documentation from the Ministry  of 
Foreign Affairs and parliamentary debates. The latter are little used in analyses of 
Italian foreign policy although they are a rich source of information on the 
development of Italian positions with respect to EPC. The paper focuses on 
counter-terrorist considerations that derive from two streams of cooperation, one 
among the Justice Ministries of the EC member states in the area of judicial and 
internal security policies within the EPC framework, and the other among the 
Interior Ministries in the field of anti-terrorism policies, the Trevi groups, under 
the EC umbrella. It argues that changes occurred in Italian foreign policy during 
the period under analysis, giving evidence of a progressive interpenetration of 
EPC into Italy’s policy-making.  
 
This case study addresses three key questions. The first looks at how far domestic 
factors led the government to embrace anti-terrorism cooperation at the European 
level. It does this against the background of the European context in order to show 
the deep implications for Italy of developments in the EC and the EPC, such as the 
newly-found common interests of the member states in the use of EPC 
mechanisms for problems concerning anti-terrorism policies, and judicial and 
intelligence security cooperation. It finds that three domestic groups were the 
major actors: (i) the industrial and commercial elites engaged in activities relating 
to supply of oil and gas from the countries of the Mediterranean, (ii) the political 
                                                                        
1 The detailed article is under consideration by the editor of an American journal for 
publication.   
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parties and (iii) the public in general. The second enquiry examines how Italy 
agreed with what was decided in the area of judicial cooperation and in the Trevi 
groups. It identifies some elements of Italy’s EPC counter-terrorist policy and it 
questions whether Italian policy was reactive, engaged in creating consensus, 
influenced by the personality factor of Italian policy-makers and aimed at avoiding 
subservience to the foreign policy of the United States. The last enquiry centres on 
how changes took place in Italian foreign policy through efforts to o ppose 
terrorism originating in the Mediterranean. It discusses five specific events (i.e. 
external factors) and their impact on Italy in order to underscore how Italy 
increasingly referred to EPC in the shaping of its own policies.  
 
These domestic, industrial and political elites, all active in the Mediterranean, 
discovered the limitations of EPC. However the paper concludes that, in spite of 
EPC’s shortcomings, the process of European integration affected Italy and its 
counter-terrorist policies, highlighting that in the 1980s, unlike the 1970s, 
behaviours and positions encouraged by EPC became a permanent part of Italy’s 
policy-making process, and that the expansion of political cooperation in the EC 
penetrated into Italy’s foreign policy to an ever greater extent.   
 
 
Ludovica Marchi 
PhD University of Reading 
Lmbr4@compuserve.com 
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Obstructive All the Way?  
British Policy towards German Unification 1989-90
* 
 
Pyeongeok An  
 
 
German unification was one of the most dramatic events in Europe after the 
Second World War, fundamentally affecting the post-war European 
architecture. The Federal Republic of Germany, whose sovereignty during 
the Cold War had been constrained by the legacies of the Second World 
War  emerged  a natural hegemon after the completion of the unification. 
German  unification also  sped up the movement towards Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) and Political Union at the European level.
 
1
1 
As one of the Three Western Powers that had maintained a responsibility for 
West Berlin and Germany as a whole,
2 Britain played a role in the external 
process of the unification. But British policy towards unification has been 
                                                                        
* A full version of this article was submitted to German Politics in January 2005 as 
an entry for the Annual Postgraduate Prize. The outcome will be known in the first 
half of 2005. If you are interested in the full article, please do not hesitate to contact 
the author by email. (pea20@cam.ac.uk). 
 
 
1  Wiedervereinigung (reunification), and  Vereinigung,  or Einigung, (Unification, 
Unity) were both used by Germans to express the unification of two German 
territories in 1 990. To be exact, however, reunification implied that a unified 
Germany would return to the borders of 1937, which was practically impossible. See 
Karl Kaiser, ‘Unity, not Reunification, for Germany,’ New York Times, 6
 October 
1989, A.31.  
2 The General Treaty on Germany between the Three Powers and West Germany in 
1954 stated that the US, France, and Britain would ‘retain the rights and 
responsibilities, heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to Berlin and 
Germany as a whole, including the unification of Germany and a peace settlement.’ 
(Article 7, 2). See, ‘Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the 
Federal Republic of Germany’, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, 
vol. 7 (Washington D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 1986), pp.112-8.  
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over-identified with that of Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. Many 
analyses either identify British policy with Mrs Thatcher’s stance, or assign 
her a dominant, even a domineering role, describing her as getting her own 
way amidst slightly differing views between Downing Street and the FCO.
3 
According to this view, British policy was judged to be reluctant at best, 
obstructive at worst. By contrast, there are only a few articles or books that 
stress any positive role played by the British during German unification. Sir 
Julian Bullard (British Ambassador to Bonn, 1983-1988) and Yvonne Klein 
do emphasise the contributions made by the FCO. They both pinpoint the 
suspension of the Four Power Rights as a British idea.
4  
                                                                        
3 See, inter alia, Lothar Kettenacker, ‘Britain and German Unification, 1989/90,' 
Klaus Larres and Elizabeth Leehan (eds.), Uneasy Allies (Oxford: OUP, 2000), pp. 
99-123; Louis Richardson, ‘British State Strategies after the Cold  War,' Robert 
Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.),  After the Cold War  (Cambridge, MA.; 
London: Harvard Universtity Press, 1993), pp. 127-154; Frank Elbe and Richard 
Kiessler, A Round Table with Sharp Corners: The Diplomatic Path to German Unity 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996), especially p. 241; Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffrey and 
William E. Paterson, ‘Deutschlands europäische Diplomatie: die Entstehung des 
regionalen Milieus,’ Werner Weidenfeld (ed.), Deutsche Europapolitik: Optionen 
wirksamer Interessenvertretung (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1998), p. 61. Simon 
Bulmer and others argue, ‘In bezug auf die deutsche Einheit bezog Thatcher, die 
zum damaligen Zeitpunkt eine dominierende Position in ihrer Regierung innehatte, 
eine erheblich ablehnende Position als das britische Aussenministerium, und sie 
setzte sich damit auch durch.’ (author’s emphasis). (With regard to German 
unification, Thatcher, who at that time occupied a dominant position in her 
government, took a more rejectionist position than the FCO and she had her own 
way.—author’s translation.). Kettenacker also shares this analysis. Both Kettenacker 
and Bulmer agree that the FCO’s position was not so different from that of Margaret 
Thatcher.  
4 Julian Bullard, ‘Great Britain and German Unification,' Jeremy Noakes, Peter 
Wende and Jonathan Wright (eds.),  Britain and Germany in Europe 1949-1990 
(Oxford: OUP, 2002); Yvonne Klein, ‘Obstructive or Promoting? British Views on 
German Unification 1989/90, German Politics 5/3 (December 1996), pp. 405-31. In 
a similar vein, she stresses the policy differences between Margaret Thatcher and the 
FCO, during the course of 1990.  
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This article is based on documents from the Federal Chancellor’s Office de-
classified in 1998,
5 alongside other primary and secondary materials
6 and 
interviews that the author conducted with major players involved in the 
process from both Germany and the UK. It shows that despite Mrs. 
Thatcher's delaying tactics, British policy towards German unification was 
actually helpful. The FCO had a different position from that taken by Mrs 
Thatcher and, through the two plus four talks, it co-operated very closely 
with the US and West Germany and made contributions to external aspects 
of German unification. In contrast to the negative repercussions generated 
by Mrs Thatcher's remarks about German unification, official British policy 
on the reunification was helpful and constructive,  though it was not 
obviously forthcoming at the early stages.  
This article elaborates further on the arguments of Bullard and Klein that 
there was a policy difference between Mrs Thatcher and the FCO, and that 
                                                                        
5 Hanns Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hofmann (eds.),  Dokumente zur 
Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit.  Sonderedition aus den Akten des 
Bundeskanzleramtes 1989/90 (Munich: Oldenburg, 1998). Being a rare exception to 
the thirty-year rule, the 430 documents disclosed give clear pictures of the German 
government's conception and implementation of the unification and integration 
policies during these crucial years. The documents provide transcripts of the 
telephone talks that Chancellor Kohl made, copies of the letters that he exchanged 
with other leaders, such as US President George Bush, the French President François 
Mitterrand, and of internal discussions in the Federal Republic of means to tackle the 
situation in East Germany. The documents are not , however, complete in that other 
archives such as those at the Foreign, Defence and Finance Ministries are still 
closed. 
6 Among the primary materials used for this article are memoirs by major players 
from the Federal Republic and the Four Occupation Powers. Helmut Kohl,  Ich 
Wollte Deutschlands Einheit, Kai Diekmann and Ralf Georg Reuth (eds.) (Munich: 
Ullstein Taschenbuch, 2000); Hans-Dietrich Genscher,  Erinnerungen, 2
nd edition 
(Berlin: Siedler, 1995); Horst Teltschik,  329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung 
(Berlin: Siedler, 1991); Margaret Thatcher, Downing Street Years, hereafter as DSY 
(London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993); Douglas Hurd, Memoirs (London: Little 
Brown, 2003); Mikhail Gorbachev, Wie Es War: Die deutsche Wiedervereinigung 
(Munich: Econ Taschenbuch, 2000); George Bush and Brent Scowcroft,  World 
Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998); James A. Baker, Politics of Diplomacy: 
Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam’s, 1995).   
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the latter made positive contributions towards the momentous event.
7  It 
seeks to clarify the reasons for the policy difference, focusing specifically 
on the policy-making process.  
The first section describes  British attitudes and policy towards the 
unexpected uncertainty precipitated by  the fall of the Berlin Wall  from 
November 1989 to the end of January 1990. The following section analyses 
the policy differences between Downing Street and the FCO that emerged 
from the end of January 1990 with the conception of the two plus four talks 
forum.   
 
Pyeongeok AN  
University of Cambridge  
pea20@cam.ac.uk 
 
                                                                        
7 Neither Bullard nor Klein refer to the ‘British Problem’ developed at the last round 
of the two plus four talks; only Bullard clarifies the timing around which the FCO 
took a pragmatic approach as being end of January. Neither used the documents de-
classified from the Federal Chancellor’s Office.  
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The High Officials in the European Communities, 1952-1967 
Methodology and sources related to the PhD project 
 
Katja Seidel 
 
 
Synopsis of the PhD Project  
To date, research on European integration history has largely been 
dominated by a national paradigm, focusing on the nation state and state 
institutions as central actors in the European integration process. However, 
at present we are experiencing a shift in research interests in European 
integration history, for the national approach reveals itself to be too narrow 
to grasp dimensions and processes of European integration that surpass the 
borders of the nation states. ‘Transnational’ and ‘supranational’ approaches 
that seek to overcome the purely national viewpoint in writing European 
history are thus the subject of growing interest among researchers.  
 
The present research project explores the emergence of a European 
administrative élite in the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel 
Community and the Commission of the European Economic Community 
between 1952 and 1967. Consequently, this thesis seeks to make a 
contribution to a supranational history of European integration.  
 
The High Authority and the Commission, as new kinds of ‘supranational’ 
administrations, were to be endowed with permanent officials, who, 
independent of the member states, played a role as pioneers in the European 
integration process. This generation of the first European civil servants is 
generally described as the idealistic generation of convinced Europeans, 
forming a European élite working together to shape Europe and to define 
European interests. It is therefore highly plausible to presume a far-reaching 
Europeanization process on the level of the European administration. In the  
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thesis, I will analyse the Europeanization of this supranational functional 
élite with its heterogeneous social and national background.  
 
The thesis addresses the following questions: On the first level, the 
organizational aspect is considered, focusing in particular on the staffing of 
the bureaucracies and on the problems that occurred when developing and 
working in a multi-national administration. The motivations of the high 
officials for seeking a career in the sector of European integration are at the 
centre of the second set of questions. The focus here lies on the diverse 
social backgrounds, education and careers of these high officials and on 
their experiences both inside and outside of the European bureaucracies as 
possible factors to Europeanization. It is important to consider factors such 
as social and professional background, as well as the experiences and 
influences the European civil servants were subjected to, when assuming 
that these factors have influenced the shape and working style of the 
European administrations and what is more, the community policy in 
general. It is therefore interesting to analyse, on a third level of the thesis, 
whether the officials of a DG shared similar ideas and concepts with their 
colleagues, i.e. regarding competition policy or the Common Agricultural 
Policy.  
Methodology 
Being conceptualised as a historical research project embedded in the 
discipline of European integration history, the principal methodology of the 
thesis can be best described as a critical analysis of primary sources. 
However, the analysis of the role of actors and institutions in the European 
integration process necessitates the application, where appropriate, of 
theories developed in the social sciences such as historical institutionalism, 
social constructivism
1 and the concept of Europeanization. 
 
Political scientists have mainly analysed the processes of Europeanization in 
terms of change, adaptation or development of European strategies for 
                                                                        
1 For an introduction to theories of European integrations such as historical 
institutionalism and social constructivism, see Wiener, A., Dietz, Th. (eds.) (2004). 
European Integration Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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different domestic policy sectors in the member states.
2 In this thesis, the 
concept of Europeanization will be applied to a group of people  - the 
European high officials - which is, by its nature, concerned with European 
matters. In this context the concept of multiple social identities as 
introduced by Risse is helpful when looking at the Europeanization of the 
identity/ies of European high officials.
3 Furthermore, the extent to which 
working in a supranational administration has influenced the behaviour and 
social identities of actors will be considered. 
 
The insights offered by historical institutionalism may be said to show that 
the early years of the European administrations have determined the face 
and, consequently, the policy of these bureaucracies. ‘In theory, therefore, 
historical institutionalism […] offer(s) the prospect, not just of claiming that 
“history matters”, but of explaining  how and  under what conditions 
historical events do – or do not – shape contemporary and future political 
choices and outcomes.’
4 
The Source Material: Archives and Interviews  
In order to study a group of European high officials whose origins lie in the 
six founding member states of the European Communities, it is necessary to 
explore  archival resources in various community and national archives 
situated in different countries. A challenging problem which anyone 
studying actors in the development of European integration will encounter is 
that the 30-year-rule does not apply to documents dealing with personnel. 
Personal files or documents issued by the DG Administration of the High 
Authority and the Commission, for example, are still not accessible. It is 
therefore indispensable to counterbalance this gap in the official 
documentation with a wide range of alternative sources as I will attempt to 
demonstrate in the following paragraphs. 
                                                                        
2 See, for example, Risse, Th., M. Green Cowles, J. Caporaso (2001) (eds.). 
Transforming Europe. Europeanization and Domestic Change. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
3 Risse, Th. (2001). A European Identity ? Europeanization and the Evolution of 
Nation-State Identities. In Risse, Green Cowles, Caporaso (2001): 198-216. 
4 Pollack, M. (2004). The New Institutionalisms and European Integration. In 
Wiener, Dietz (2004): 137-156, 140.   
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The initial sources referred to were the holdings of the European archives, 
i.e.  the  Historical Archives of the European Commission in Brussels 
(http://europa.eu.int/historical_archives/) and the Historical Archives of the 
European Union in Florence (www.iue.it/ECArchives/). Both archives hold 
the official records  of the High Authority (CEAB) and the Commission 
(BAC). For this research, internal working papers, speeches written by high 
officials as well as internal discussions about the institutional setting of the 
European administrations are of key importance. The minutes of the weekly 
meetings of the High Authority and the Commission to a certain extent also 
reveal discussions about staffing and administrative problems. In addition, 
the archives in Florence hold the private papers of several high officials 
such as Max Kohnstamm, Emile Noël or Pierre Uri, and a rich collection of 
interviews with relevant actors. 
 
The holdings of the Community archives are complemented by the holdings 
of the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe in Lausanne (Switzerland) 
(www.jean-monnet.ch). This institution holds the personal papers of Jean 
Monnet including files that cover the administrative problems of the earliest 
period of the High Authority administration, a portion of the private papers 
of Robert Schuman, those of Robert Marjolin, a former collaborator of 
Monnet and EEC-Commissioner, and a number of transcribed interviews. 
 
It is indispensable for this thesis to supplement the source material of the 
Community archives with source material from national archives. Among 
the most interesting collections are those of the Archives Nationales (AN) 
(www.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr) and the archives of the Foreign 
Ministry of France (www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/archives) in Paris. The AN 
hold the private papers of European actors such a s René Mayer and 
Christian Pineau as well as documents of the French government related to 
the negotiation of the Paris and Rome Treaties, and the files of the 
Commissariat général du Plan, founded by Jean Monnet. Furthermore, in the 
German Bundesarchiv in Koblenz (www.bundesarchiv.de) I will analyse the 
private papers of Walter Hallstein and Franz Etzel.  
 
The archives of political parties usually contain the personal papers of their 
important party members, some of them also actors at the European level. 
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For example, the International Institute for Social History (IISH) 
(www.iisg.nl) in Amsterdam holds the personal papers of Sicco Mansholt 
and his chef de cabinet Alfred Mozer. The German archives of the Christian 
Democratic Party (CDU) (www.kas.de/archiv/) in Sankt Augustin store the 
papers of Hans von der Groeben, a Commissioner in Brussels between 1958 
and 1970. 
 
In addition to archival sources, the source materials for this thesis include 
memoirs and other published texts of high officials; speeches; contemporary 
newspaper and journal articles, as well as semi-structured interviews.  
 
Interviews are an important source of first-hand information on the life and 
work of the high officials. I have already conducted approximately 25 semi-
structured interviews with former high officials of the High Authority (for 
example with Max Kohnstamm, Edmond Wellenstein, Marcel Jaurant-
Singer and Simon Nora) and the EEC-Commission (among them Professor 
Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, Professor Aurelio Pappalardo, Franz 
Froschmaier, Helmut von Verschuer and Georges Rencki). I consider 
interviews indispensable for research projects related to the personnel of the 
European Communities. These can, to a certain extent, compensate for the 
lack of access to personal files where even after 30 years this is blocked. 
Personal interviews offer additional insight into the biographical 
background and the career choices of these people.  
 
A general problem that remains is how to verify the information obtained 
through an interview. However, the more interviews one conducts, the more 
one is able to compare the declarations of the interviewees, a procedure 
which helps to establish the credibility of  the narrators’ accounts. The 
comparison of the statements of different interviewees from the same DGs, 
and the comparison of oral statements with (written) source material and 
secondary literature, seems to be the only solution to this problem.  
 
To summarise, in most cases interviews can reveal valuable information 
about the biographies and the careers of the high officials under 
consideration. The interviews can convey an idea of the atmosphere in the  
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multi-national administrations of the 1950s and 1960s that does not 
necessarily emerge from the official documents in the archives. The 
ensemble of t he interviewee’s statements  – together with the available 
written sources – can help to clarify questions such as those of the origins 
and sources of the European identities of European high officials, or 
whether there exist typical ‘European’ career patterns.  
The fieldwork for this research will be completed by summer 2005.  
 
Katja Seidel 
University of Portsmouth 
Katja.Seidel@port.ac.uk 
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The Constitutionalisation of the European Community: 
West Germany between Legal Sovereignty and European 
Integration 1958-1974  
 
Methodology and Source Material 
 
Billy Davies 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The European Union’s extensive and powerful legal framework has proven 
to be a key process in the ever deepening integration at the European level.  
In his pioneering work, The Constitution of Europe, JHH Weiler (1999)
1 has 
placed particular importance on the early ‘foundational period’ between 
1958 and 1973. In this period, four legal doctrines were established which 
proved instrumental in  the shift  – at least judicially  – towards a federal 
Europe.  These are the Doctrines of Direct Effect (1963), Supremacy (1964), 
Human Rights (1969), and of Implied Powers (1970).  Whereas EU scholars 
have largely accepted Weiler’s analysis of the evolution and importance of 
EU law, none have challenged the simplistic assumption on which it is 
based, that in this period, the legal-political framework of the EC simply 
‘crystallized’.  Such a view presupposes a passivity of national institutions 
in the face of the erosion of their legal powers, which has thus far never 
been subject to academic scrutiny. 
 
My thesis will investigate how the fundamental transformations in the 
qualitative nature of the European legal system were received at the national 
level.  Specifically, it will test the assumption that leading figures in one of 
the EEC’s most pro-integration member states, the FRG, welcomed 
movements towards a more legally integrated Europe.  Germany has broadly 
been regarded as supportive of integration, because the increased economic 
                                                                        
1 Weiler J.H.H., (1999); “The Constitution of Europe:  Do the New Clothes have an 
Emperor?” , Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press Weiler, 1999, pp 10-101.  
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exchange which this furthered underlined its post-War identity as the 
‘Wirtschaftswunder’.  However, Germany also defined itself through the 
new-found rigour of its legal system.  The constitutionalisation of European 
law brought both of these post-War traditions into potential conflict.  My 
research examines the reactions of leading figures in the German elite 
towards the penetration by the European Court of Justice to see whether this 
was resented as an as infringing on legal-political sovereignty, or whether it 
was embraced as a Europe-wide extension of the  Rechtsstaat tradition.  
Additionally, I want to investigate whether the Court’s actions were, on a 
popular level, seen in terms of legal empowerment vis-à-vis national courts, 
or as an infringement of national sovereignty given that it was a 
Luxembourg court that assumed powers over matters which affected 
important national rights. 
 
While most observers agree that the constitutionalisation of EU law has 
taken place, we still know very little about why this has come about.  It is 
difficult to find any form of historicisation of European legal evolution in 
existing literature or current debates.  Consequently, assumptions are made 
concerning the attitudes of certain Member States towards the development 
of an integrated Europe.  The juxtaposition of a developing sense of national 
constitutional patriotism and the willingness to submit to an external legal 
structure suggests that the acceptance of European legal doctrine in West 
Germany was much more complex than has hitherto been asserted.  My 
study will not only break new ground in understanding the nature of the 
constitutionalisation of European law.  Furthermore, by investigating how 
the public, the political, interest group and bureaucratic elites, and the legal 
profession defined the ‘national’ interest vis-à-vis European law, my 
dissertation will add to debates as to whether European integration can best 
be understood in terms of intergovernmentalism (integration as a result of 
national interest) or supranationalism (integration as a result of structural 
pressures in the context of globalisation). 
 
Methodology 
The thesis has five main sections of analysis: 
 
1.  Political leaders 
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(a)  Government (CDU/CSU 1949-66, Grand Coalition 1966-69, SPD 
1969-74) 
(b)  Opposition  
 
2.  Bureaucratic elites 
(a)  Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(b)  Ministry of Justice 
(c)  Ministry of Economics 
 
3.  Legal-Academic circles 
 
4.  Interest Group actors 
(a)  Trade Unions 
(b)  Employers Associations 
(c)  Churches 
 
5.  Public Opinion 
 
Particularly close attention will be paid in the analysis of each social sector 
to how elite aspirations and goals for the integration project were 
transmitted and perceived by public opinion.  The beginnings of my 
research have shown a fervent belief in integration amongst government and 
bureaucratic elites during the period, but amongst the other groups there was 
a spectrum of views, ranging from indifference through to outright hostility.  
The question then to be raised by this is why West Germany was always 
perceived as a pro-integration Member State when only a small elite really 
wanted and understood the aims of the project?  How did they ‘sell’ the 
project to the other sectors?  How did the major shift between the CDU and 
SPD governments affect opinion towards EU Law?  How did the political 
elites within the SPD reconcile their early opposition to European 
integration with becoming a government in 1969 deeply bound into the 
integration project? Was the interaction with public opinion pro- or 
reactive?  The relationship between elite aspirations and public perception 
will then be a critical question of my further research.   
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This prospect raises a further question for careful consideration.  Elite-
public interaction is clearly a question for the political scientist, yet my work 
is a historical piece.  Reflections will have to be made on the divergences 
and parallels between the fields of History and Political Science, particularly 
in a work analyzing such recent (and on-going) history.  An early attempt at 
demarcation can be made.  It could be said that Political Science is the study 
of institutions, processes and procedures, predominately contemporary ones, 
but it could also be of past or defunct bodies.  History is the study of these in 
their temporal, social and political context.  Institutional history (as for 
example in this case, examinations of the Bundesverfassungsgericht or the 
European Court of Justice) is much more difficult to demarcate from 
Political Science, but draws on the same broader immediacy/context 
dichotomy as Political Science and History do in general.  Institutional 
history has as a goal in itself the contextualization of an institution in its 
broader historical environment.  A Political Scientist might merely draw on 
this to make further or more proactive assertions about their present and 
future behaviour. 
 
These questions currently facing me in my research stand alongside the 
more typical work of the historian – gathering information and sources from 
the various archives in Germany and around Europe 
 
 
Source Material 
My studies are currently based in Berlin, Germany.  This has afforded me 
extensive use of the comprehensive university and state library system 
found in the German capital, as well as easy access to a number of archives 
also found there.    
 
Libraries 
•  Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin (Berlin State Library) 
The State Library has two main buildings – one in Unter den Linden, the 
second on Potsdamer Platz.  The first houses older texts and manuscripts, as 
well as a good sized collection of modern literature.   The second, on 
Potsdamer Platz, contains an archive of German and other European 
newspapers and journals, as well as a very large selection of information on 
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almost all academic fields.  Further details can be found on the State Library 
website:  http://www.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de  
 
•  Universitätsbibliothek (University Libraries) 
Berlin has three major universities, each with their own library system.  The 
Freie Universität Berlin library is in west/south Berlin:  http://www.ub.fu-
berlin.de.  The Technische Universität is located in west Berlin:  
http://www.ub.tu-berlin.de.  Finally, the Humboldt Universität can be found 
in central Berlin, its library website being:  http://www.ub.hu-berlin.de. 
 
Of particular relevance to my research is the outstanding Walter Hallstein 
Institute for European Constitutional Law based at the Humboldt Universität 
(http://www.whi-berlin.de/), where a lot of the leading legal-academic 
specialists in the field give lectures, lead seminars and can be contacted with 
questions and queries.  Papers going back to 1997 are available online on 
the website.  These relate predominately to juridical-legal questions, but 
there are several commentaries relating to elements of European history and 
identity.  WHI Paper 18/04 is a recent paper in this area, available on the 
website, which is highly recommended. 
 
•  Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund Berlin-Brandenburg (KOBV) 
(Cooperative Library Association Berlin-Brandenburg) 
The KOBV is a collective of all of Berlin and Brandenburg’s libraries, 
brought together under one regionalised internet portal.  Information about 
the libraries and catalogues can be found in one website:  
http://www.kobv.de  
 
Archives 
Berlin offers good access to a number of archives.  A lot of my current 
research is being undertaken at the Political Archive of the German Foreign 
Office. (http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de), which is located in the Foreign 
Office itself in the centre of the city.  The material here is well catalogued, 
can be ordered electronically, copies are easily ordered and the files 
themselves are quickly and easily accessible through the excellent and 
friendly service offered by the archive staff.  The material is subject to a 
thirty-year secrecy clause and access to the Reading Room is subject to  
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written approval by archive staff.  Doctoral students need a letter of 
recommendation from their supervisor and all visitors must leave a form of 
ID (Passport, driving licence) when entering the Foreign Office.  The other 
Ministry archives (in this case, Justice and Economics) are located in the 
main Federal Archive in Koblenz in western Germany 
(http://www.bundesarchiv.de).  
 
Berlin is also the seat of the German Parliament.  Parliamentary debates and 
other materials relating to federal deputies can be found in the 
Parlamentsarchiv des Deutschen Bundestages:  http://www.bundestag.de/ 
bic/archiv/index.html  
 
Among archives outside Germany, I plan to use the ECJ library/archive in 
Luxembourg, the European Court of Justice has a library/archive in Luxembourg. 
(http://curia.eu.int/en/instit/services/index.htm). Written agreement in advance is 
needed to visit the library, although this was easily forthcoming.  Of course, 
the main source of information outside of Germany for my topic is the 
European Union Historical Archive in Florence 
(http://www.iue.it/ECArchives).  Of special importance to my subject is the 
material found there from Walter Hallstein’s Chef de Cabinet on the 
Commission and later a leading figure at the Federal Chancellor’s Office, 
Klaus Meyer.   
 
Being based in Berlin is ideal for undertaking my research.  As indicated, 
the library facilities and academic possibilities are outstanding and 
moreover, the German capital enjoys excellent air, train and road 
connections to western, central and eastern Europe.  I am currently at the 
beginning of my second year of my doctorate.  After completing the archival 
research in Germany, I have the intention to return to London at the end of 
2005 and to finish my thesis by September 2006.   
 
Billy Davies 
King’s College London 
Billydavies25@hotmail.co.uk 
 